

# THEOLOGY

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## EDITORIAL

THE season of Harvest Festivals will shortly be approaching; and there will be many country clergy who will be wondering how to adapt the lessons of these occasions to the plight of agriculture all around them. As we write these words on Lammas Day, there seems a faint hope that the Government may brace itself to face the facts of the situation, and take at least some initial steps to give the greatest industry of the country the help it so sorely needs. But, failing that, the Harvest Festival Thanksgiving may well strike a false note, unless care be taken. It is not that God has withheld any of the bounties of nature, nor that the husbandman has been idle or extravagant; but simply that the fruits of the harvest have been refused their just price by the selfishness of large elements in the nation which Parliament is afraid to restrain. The case, to put it bluntly, is that of Dives and Lazarus writ large—Dives the city-dweller, whose wages and conditions of life are protected by legislation and Trade Union rules up to the hilt; and Lazarus the farmer lying at his gate, impoverished and ignored.

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The consequences of this selfishness are as inevitable and as devastating as they were in the parable; and already the weakening of the national credit and the mounting figures of unemployment are beginning to cause disquiet even to the blindest partisans. Remedies, moreover, are near at hand; the path of national economy has been plainly indicated, and ways are open by which the State can encourage industry instead of corrupting the desire for it by doles. There is one obstacle, however, which underlies all others—the fact that the remedies involve moral effort. And in that regard the clergy are in an exceptionally strong position to speak to the nation's plight. Better than any politicians they know the facts; they grind no axe of personal ambition; and, alone among the various



professions, the clergy are receiving today lower "real wages" than was the case before the war. We are told that the Government can do nothing in advance of public opinion. If that be true, it is as complete a confession of failure as democracy could give. But in any case the state of public opinion is of obvious importance; and the Church has a great opportunity of educating and guiding it.

But the Church has more than an opportunity: it has a duty. It has a special duty, because the rapid inflation of the social services, which is one of the main causes of our present economic peril, has been so largely encouraged by Christian opinion. It is all very well to start building a tower, but the cost has got to be counted; and our social idealists did not count it. And the result is to confront, not this or that class of the population which advertises a grievance, but the entire nation, with the danger of sufferings and losses of incalculable magnitude. The Church has now to undertake the far less pleasant task of calling on the country to be honest with itself. The note was sounded, we remember, not uncertainly by the Archbishop of Canterbury in his New Year message last January; but echoes have been few. What has to be dealt with is the selfishness not of privileged individuals but of whole classes of the population; and only a revived sense of the needs and claims of the entire nation as against any and every sectional interest within it will suffice to overcome it.



## THE SACRAMENTS OF THE CHURCH\*

### I.

I HAVE been asked to make the subject of this paper the sacraments of the Church, and in particular the Eucharist. It is obvious that I shall serve a more useful purpose by picking out certain major points, rather than by making any attempt to cover the whole ground; and I propose to try to deal briefly with the conception of sacraments, and, in regard to the Eucharist, with the doctrine of the Eucharistic sacrifice. Even so, time will only admit of the presentation of certain lines of thought and not of elaborate argument and defence. But I would ask you to believe that the views which I shall try to express represent certain tendencies in sacramental theology which deserve your consideration. Not only are they winning very considerable support among Anglican theologians. Not only has much which I shall try to say close connections with the work of two great French theologians, that of Billot on the relation of the sacraments to grace, and that of de la Taille on the Eucharistic sacrifice. The point which I wish to emphasize is that in each case the view presented is directed to securing an advance in theology which will allow full weight to past criticisms of traditional teaching, and which will effect a synthesis between such teaching and these reactions from it.

The first topic with which I shall deal concerns the root problem in all reflection on the sacraments: how can rites and ceremonies be thought of as conveying and causing grace in any other sense than that they implant or foster, by their symbolism, ideas which are necessary or helpful to the religious life? The simplest, and a very common, answer is that in fact it is only in this way that the sacraments bring grace. The objection to that over-simple solution is twofold. In the first place, it involves a breach with Holy Scripture. The time has passed when it was widely maintained even by liberal Protestant theologians that St. Paul's conception of either Baptism or the Eucharist could be interpreted in this way. Those theologians who think in this way of the relation of the sacraments to grace admit in general that St. Paul assigned to the sacraments a more important and more direct function, and regard him indeed as having corrupted in this and other respects the original Gospel. In the second place, the view in question fits ill with the main tradition of Christian experience. I am not concerned to discuss the relative merits of Catholic and

\* A paper read at a meeting of the Scottish Church Union.



Protestant piety and devotion. The point which I wish to make is that, to say the least, Catholic piety, as seen for example in a St. Francis or a Fr. Dolling, is such as to make it very improbable that the truth is wholly on the other side, and that the large majority of Christians are merely wrong in holding that the sacraments produce an effect which is more than subjective. Protestant thought may be justified in its criticism of much current and traditional teaching as to the sacraments. It remains not only possible but overwhelmingly probable that we have to seek a synthesis, rather than reject unreservedly the traditional teaching of Catholicism.

The essence of Catholic teaching, Roman, Anglican or Orthodox, is that the sacraments cause and convey grace for those who receive them in good faith. The problem is how any such conception can meet the criticism that it involves belief in magic. The answer put forward by Billot (reverting, so he and his followers would maintain, to the teaching of Aquinas) is that the sacraments do not convey grace directly, but that they convey a right or title to grace from which grace results in the case of those who use the sacraments in good faith. That is at first sight a somewhat forbidding conception, the more so since it is couched in almost legal language. I do not propose to discuss what is from our point of view the comparatively unimportant issue, to which Roman theologians necessarily give prominence, as to how far Billot's teaching agrees with that of St. Thomas Aquinas, and with the later as well as the earlier teaching of St. Thomas. Nor do I wish to suggest that the view which I shall try to put before you is precisely that of Billot himself. On his view grace results from the right or title to grace, which the sacraments convey, unless there is an "obex," that is to say unless there is a positive obstacle, in the spiritual condition of the recipient. Much turns on precisely how the word grace is understood, but as it is *ordinarily* understood, I believe the truth to be that in general active appropriation is necessary for the reception of sacramental grace, rather than merely the absence of any positive obstacle. The distinction is less than might appear at first sight, since in general a spiritual state which is not such as to present an "obex" would involve as a matter of course any necessary effort to appropriate grace. It is important, however, in its bearing on the practical religious life, through the emphasis which it gives to the necessity for effort on our part. Nor is it in any way inconsistent with the view that the right or title which the sacraments convey is the true cause of the grace which we thus secure. If, through taking some drug, I am able to run considerably faster than I otherwise could, the drug and not my effort is the cause of my unusual



speed, even although my effort is necessary. Or if it is only because I am a King's courier (and have as such certain special facilities) that I can travel with exceptional speed from London to York, my status, and not the effort necessary on my part, accounts for my unusual speed. There is one further point to which attention should be drawn. I have deliberately used the double analogy of the drug and the courier since the *status* conferred by the sacraments can in no case be thought of as something conveying merely external facilities. The status conferred by the sacraments, for example by Baptism, involves, and indeed is constituted by, a changed relation to God who is the giver and sustainer of all our powers. Any such change of status must be thought of as affecting these, as conferring new or enhanced capacities. Our capacities are no more and no less than the possibilities afforded us by God.

The question remains as to whether and why the sacraments can be rightly regarded as conveying a change of status which carries with it a right or title to grace, and which thus enables us to appropriate grace in a manner which, at least normally, would not otherwise be possible. The Eucharist stands in a peculiar position since in that case the symbolism of the relevant action, of communion, depends on a symbolism given antecedently to certain objects. The significance of communion depends on the significance of the bread and wine as describable in some sense as the Body and Blood of Christ. That is the case quite apart from whether one accepts a Catholic or a Zwinglian doctrine of the sacrament, even if the consecrated bread and wine merely represent the Body and Blood. In the Eucharist the symbolism is primarily of objects, and the symbolism of the action depends on the significance assigned earlier to the objects. In Baptism, and in the other acts which we regard as sacramental, the symbolism is directly of action. In Baptism, the action is the act of washing, an act which does not depend for its significance on any special setting apart of certain water and thus assigning some special significance to that water. The water may be set apart for its use in Baptism, but whether it is or is not does not affect the significance of Baptism.

The first point which I wish to make is that there is nothing abnormal or peculiar to the sacraments in the conferring of a status, which carries certain rights and opportunities, by means of some ceremony or other, nor in this ceremony, and its due performance by some particular person, being normally necessary for the purpose. For myself the most obvious example lies in the fact that no one can exercise certain rights and privileges or draw certain emoluments unless he has been admitted a Fellow of a College by the Master or his deputy. Further, the Master can



only admit in accordance with a prescribed ceremonial and by means of a prescribed formula. It is, of course, the case that the ultimate authority, which lies behind, that is to say the Governing Body acting with the consent of H.M. Privy Council, could vary or render unnecessary that procedure. But those of us are bound who hold authority under and from that ultimate authority. We can do certain things, but if we are to do them it must be in certain ways. What is the explanation? Is such a system childish and valueless, or rightly designed to serve its purpose, whether in the case of a College or in all the other quite different examples of a similar procedure which very little reflection will suggest? In point of fact some overt and decisive act of admission is essential, since it is important that everyone should know who are, for example, Fellows of a College and that their tenure should be beyond dispute. Further, since it is important to emphasize the corporate character of such a body as a College, and such dignity as a Fellowship possesses, it is desirable that this overt act should be performed by someone who represents the College in a special manner, and that the act should be public and dignified. It is for these reasons that the required procedure is prescribed: and, as I have said, while it is prescribed it both effects its purpose and is normally necessary.

Turn to the case of Baptism. The position is that all Christians are agreed that it is by Christ's acceptance of us, in virtue of that acceptance and on the basis of that acceptance, that we are saved and that supernatural grace is forthcoming for us. What is in issue is whether such acceptance has an external expression, whether it is conferred and should be sought in a visible rite. There is no question but that when Baptism is not obtainable such acceptance is certainly secured otherwise. There is no substantial question even when Baptism is obtainable, but is believed, wrongly but in good faith, to be unnecessary. What is maintained is that our Lord empowers His Church to accept men and women on His behalf, that this power can only be exercised, by those acting on behalf of the Church, in an appointed manner, and that only in abnormal circumstances is it legitimate to assume that there is acceptance by Christ apart from the sacrament.

The question is whether this view of the sacrament is correct: whether it is reasonable to hold that a visible rite should be the means of acceptance and whether in fact such a means has been prescribed by our Lord. First as to the ground for regarding such a rite as reasonable: in purely secular analogies it is the case, as in the illustration I used, that such a method of admission is valuable where admission is to a body corporate and where it



is important that admission should be an overt and indisputable fact. But the Church, the New Israel, is a Body corporate in a unique degree, and such considerations are in consequence directly applicable. Further, psychologically, overt acceptance of this character has the advantage that it best affords assurance to timid consciences that they can claim grace as being accepted by Christ. Secondly, there is the major question as to whether our Lord has prescribed such a method of acceptance. A century ago confident appeal would have been made to certain texts. Critical considerations have left those less decisive than would then have been supposed. It is clear, however, that from the first the Church employed this method, acting, as it believed, with His authority. On the one hand, this was so early and so general as to suggest very strongly that the Church did this in the fulfilment of definite teaching given during our Lord's earthly life. But, on the other hand, even if there was no such definite teaching, the Church's action would be sufficient if in fact the Church or its pastors had authority from Christ to act on His behalf, deciding such matters under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. In the last resort the Catholic conception depends on the view that this was the case, that the Apostles conceived themselves as having such authority, and that they were right in so doing. That view rests, not on isolated texts, but on the New Testament as a whole. In passing I would draw your attention to the fact that it is for this reason, because of the impropriety of requiring or relying on particular texts rather than Apostolic practice, that we are bound to insist on other rites besides Baptism and the Eucharist, and to maintain in particular that Confirmation is also sacramental.

## II.

The other topic of this paper is the doctrine of the Eucharistic sacrifice. I do not propose to discuss the doctrine of the Real Presence, in part because I tried to discuss that doctrine not only in the final essay in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, but at greater length, with the immense assistance of collaboration with Professor Taylor, in a paper read to the last Anglo-Catholic Congress and published in the report of that Congress. But my main reason is the belief that, when once the doctrine of the Real Presence is dissociated from belief in any material or quasi-material identity between the sacrament and our Lord's natural Body and Blood, the doctrine is in fact very generally accepted in our Church. We believe that by receiving the sacrament we are, in the measure of our spiritual capacity, made partakers in the blessings of our Lord's sacrifice and in His life. And,



always so long as no quasi-material change is supposed to be involved, we recognize in general that objects which not only represent our Lord as given to be our sacrificial and spiritual food, but which enable us to appropriate Him as such, both are naturally described as being sacramentally His Body and Blood, and afford a natural focus for our devotion. Rightly or wrongly, I doubt whether there is anything like so general a recognition of the significance of the Eucharist, not as a means of grace, not as a special occasion for the worship of our Lord, but as an act of sacrificial worship directed to God the Father.

Here again much past teaching has been open to very grave objection. It is not possible to deny that the Eucharist would derogate from the finality of Calvary if it involved any fresh immolation of our Lord, or any real change in or for Him corresponding to an immolation. The medieval teaching was not necessarily or always inconsistent with belief in the finality of Calvary, but there was not infrequently formal inconsistency; and, at the least, it failed adequately to safeguard that most vital doctrine. Here again, however, there have recently emerged somewhat new conceptions, not only among Anglican, but also, and somewhat earlier, among Roman theologians—conceptions which outflank, as it seems to me, old difficulties. In the Church of Rome these conceptions are associated with the name of de la Taille: but here again, while what I shall say has close affinities with his teaching, I do not wish to suggest that I shall state precisely his view. The differences are, however, as I believe, in the main superficial—and, in view of a certain difference of terminology, more superficial than might at first sight appear.

I can best introduce you to the conceptions in question by pointing out the large part which sacrifice has played in systems of worship and by reminding you that it played such a part long after anyone seriously supposed that the gods were bribed by a gift, or fed on the sacrificial smoke. Even in regard to propitiatory sacrifices, it is easy to see that these depended for their significance on their constituting an acknowledgment to God and declaration to man of the existence of sin and that the wages of sin is death. Suppose a tribe to believe that some god demanded the death of their king. If they slit his throat in his sleep without rite or ceremony we would describe their purpose as the propitiation of the god. But we would not describe the act as a sacrifice, save by way of metaphor, unless by some rite or ceremony the act was expressly invested with its religious significance. Propitiatory sacrifices are essentially a part and parcel of a system of worship, serving, as I have said, to acknowledge before God, and to declare to man, the fact



and significance of sin. Nor, save in one instance alone, is the death itself more than that which is made a symbol to express that fact and significance. The blood of bulls and of goats cannot put away sin. Long after this truth was realized, sacrifices persisted because they were the means of acknowledgment to God and declaration to man, and because men found a suitable symbol in a death inflicted because of sin. They were right so to do. As we believe (and Christian saint and mystic have found the mainspring of their life in that belief), in His Death on the Cross our Lord gave His life "as a ransom for many." Difficult as it is to understand in any degree the doctrine of the Atonement, it is childish to deny a doctrine so deeply entrenched in Christian experience. Nor is it impossible to see in part what that Death secured. The drama of mankind and of man's relation to God would be imperfect, and therefore impossible for God, unless the awful significance of sin had found full expression. Even the canons we could apply to some play by a human author may serve to show us that. God's free forgiveness is possible without any such imperfection because, or rather in part because, the significance of sin could find no more terrible or more ample expression than that man could slay Him who was the only begotten Son of the Father, and Very God. As we believe, the Death of Christ was necessary and was effectual. But if there was to be an acknowledgment before God and a declaration to man of this necessity, and that this necessity was occasioned by sin, if our Lord's Death was to be a propitiatory sacrifice, His death must somehow have been expressly invested with this significance.

Our Lord might indeed have consecrated His death to its appointed end, and invested it with its significance, by some act done once and for all in which we had no part. He willed otherwise, doing so in and through a rite to be continued down the centuries and over the nations, and to be renewed until the end. In and through the consecration of bread and wine, by Him or by His authority, to be sacramentally His Body and Blood, He invests His Death with its significance; and in that consecration of His sacrifice, and in the acknowledgment thus effected, it is given to us to participate. If we identify sacrifice almost exclusively with immolation as in the sixteenth century all parties tended to do, then our Lord's sacrifice must be thought of as confined to Calvary. But if we recognize that the consecration of a sacrifice, whereby the death is expressly invested with its significance, constitutes a no less essential element, then the matter is different.

May I try to make clear what I mean by a quotation



from something I have written elsewhere? "Imagine a traditional New Year rite involving the slaughter of a victim, without any particular ceremony, the flesh being then sent to all the temples in the city and consumed in each case after a solemn blessing of the flesh which directly invested the immolation with a sacrificial significance. I do not think anyone would hesitate to describe such a rite as a sacrifice, or to say that there was a single sacrifice (since there was a single immolation), or notwithstanding this to say, if he had been present in a particular temple, that the rite at which he had been present was the New Year sacrifice. Whether he would speak of that sacrifice as having been offered in the temple would depend simply on whether in current usage the word 'offer' necessarily referred to the immolation or might be used both of the immolation and of the liturgical acts which consecrate the immolation." Sacrifice consists of three parts, the giving of the victim, the immolation, and the liturgical consecration which expressly invests the sacrifice with its significance. In the One Sacrifice of our Lord the first two were finished on Calvary, but that self-offering and death are consecrated to be a sacrifice in and through the Last Supper and the Eucharist.

In conclusion: What is the importance of all this? Not merely that one may justify traditional language; but that we may recover the centrality of the Cross in our worship. The Eucharist has been overshadowed as an act of worship. It has become too exclusively a means of individual communion. This has been the case in part because theology failed to provide conceptions which, while doing justice to the significance of the Eucharist as the supreme act of sacrificial worship, did so without ceasing to emphasize and to safeguard the finality of the self-offering and of the immolation effected on Calvary. If in any degree the line of thought which I have tried to sketch serves on consideration to meet that difficulty, if in any degree by so doing it assists you to restore the Eucharist to its rightful place in our worship, this paper will have served its chief purpose. *Lex orandi, Lex credendi.* We learn more from our worship than from theology. In so far as our Lord's sacrifice is central in that worship, the thought of that sacrifice will more easily remain the centre of our lives.

WILL SPENS.



## MORTIFICATION

THE subject of this paper is of the greatest importance, for apart from mortification the spiritual life is impossible; but it is a subject which is very widely misunderstood and feared. To many the term simply connotes a masochistic tendency, cultivated to an unhealthy degree by the monks of the dark ages, which should be discarded by all healthy-minded people. Others, with their eyes firmly fixed on the unessential and particular, believe it to be concerned wholly with terrific austerities and so turn away from it through fear.

As a fact both of these ideas—they can hardly be called views—are wrong, and spring from entire misconceptions of the nature of mortification, which is a necessity to all serious life (and *a fortiori* to all spiritual life whether Christian or otherwise), and is clearly laid down as a fundamental principle of the Gospel by our Lord Himself. The contemporary notion of free self-expression as the ideal of life is pernicious and untrue, and produces nothing but unscrupulous egoism; for serious progress in any walk of life mortification is necessary if a man is to be anything more than a piece of mechanism. The doctor, the scientist, the lawyer, the soldier, the sailor, the business man must all learn to “scorn delights and live laborious days”; if they are to accomplish anything, free self-expression is of no use whatever to them. And the same thing is true, in a far deeper degree, of the life of the spirit; those who would serve God must refuse to serve self, those who would be one with Him must be empty of self, and the means thereto are mortification and prayer. The undisciplined soul cannot be the instrument of the Holy Spirit, and the means of attaining to self-discipline is mortification.

Much opposition and indifference towards mortification is due simply to concupiscence; the self does not want to be disciplined and so maintains vigorously that mortification is either unnecessary or mischievous or both; but the Christian way is the way of Christ, and no soul was ever yet perfected without the Cross. It is therefore of first importance that we should face the fact and necessity of mortification.

Even among the pious this fundamental need is often set aside, and so we see the unedifying spectacle of people who are probably an immense trial to their relations and friends desiring to be “mystics” and absorbing multitudes of little books which purport to teach them how to become such in six months or so, at the same time showing no desire for Confession and making



no notable attempts to curb their concupiscence or extirpate their sins. To such people the love of Jesus crucified is pure sentimentality, producing no fruit in their own lives, but rather resulting in self-deception; they should ponder well the words of an old spiritual writer who says that "to aspire to perfection without the serious practice of mortification is merely to nourish self-love, and to feed our imperfections without making any progress."\*

Fundamentally, mortification is simply the living of the gospel life. For this reason great Evangelicals, no less than great Catholics, have been people of great mortification; we must, therefore, look in the gospel for the root of the matter.

Our Lord teaches us quite unmistakably that the Christian vocation is the love of God ("Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment"),† and the end which we are to seek is nothing less than the perfection of God ("Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect").‡ This vocation and this end are a pearl of great price the value of which is not something but everything ("The kingdom of heaven is like unto a merchantman seeking goodly pearls, who, when he had found one pearl of great price, went and sold all that he had, and bought it").§ This teaching is universal; our Lord does not confine it to the few, it is a principle of the kingdom of heaven. God asks all men to love Him and, as a necessary consequence, to leave all else for the sake of that love. In order to be attached to God by love we must be detached from all things created; that is why our Lord required of the rich young ruler, who was, after all, a good and pious young man, that he should sell all that he had,|| and said to the multitude, "Whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple."¶

Detachment is fundamental to the spiritual life. Thus St. Ignatius makes it the foundation of his *Spiritual Exercises*. "Man was created," he says, "to praise, do reverence to, and serve God our Lord, and thereby to save his soul. . . . Hence it follows that man should make use of creatures so far as they do help him towards his end, and should withdraw from them so far as they are a hindrance to him in regard of that end. Wherefore it is necessary to make ourselves detached in regard of all created things."\*\*

But detachment must go further than things and extend also to persons. "He that loveth father or mother more than

\* Barbanson, *The Secret Paths of Divine Love*, Part. I., cap. iv.

† Matt. xxii. 37-8.

‡ Matt. v. 48.

§ 7 Matt. xiii. 45-6.

|| Mark. x. 17-22.

¶ Luke xiv. 33.

\*\* *Spiritual Exercises*, Rickaby's edition, p. 18.



me is not worthy of me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me. And he that taketh not his cross, and followeth after me, is not worthy of me."\* This is a hard saying, and one that is so frequently misunderstood that the majority of Christians tend to put it aside altogether; yet it is fundamental to true Christianity. It should be noted that Christ does not tell us to cease from loving others; rather He says that we shall love our neighbour as ourselves, but the love of our neighbour is subordinate to the love of God, and springs from it. It becomes sinful when we love him more than God; in a real sense we must, if we would love God truly, leave all other and cleave unto Him alone. "The spiritual man must learn to leave himself and all other things for the love of God. He must possess nothing with any tenacious affection of heart. He must hold fast to no visible and perishable thing, to no passing and created object. He must not seek the friendship, familiar intercourse or presence of anyone, however holy, for any mere natural gratification. He must remember that not only bad things, but even those that are good, may become hindrances if they are loved or sought inordinately."†

By detachment we strive to give our whole self to God that all our willing, loving, and desiring may be in Him; this involves the discipline of the whole man and the collecting of all the powers of the soul into one, that being detached from the pursuit of pleasure for its own sake, the soul may find pleasure in God alone. "As a stream which divides its waters into many channels cannot communicate itself so plentifully to all as it would to one, if all the others were stopped up: so it is absolutely necessary that we set some stops or bounds to our hearts, that so, having checked all corrupt inclinations and inordinate love of ourselves, we may with greater freedom apply the whole current of our affections to the only object of all our good, God and His love.

"*Humanum cor* (says St. Thomas) *tanto intensius in aliquid unum fertur, quanto magis a multis revocatur*: Man's heart adheres the more intensely unto one thing, by how much the more it is withdrawn from all others. Wherefore one of the principal means of gaining the divine love is the collecting of all the powers of the soul into one, so that they may be able to fix themselves on God alone, exercising themselves day and night in whatever may stir them up to love Him. For as long as, being full of the love of earthly things, we let our understanding, will and memory dissipate themselves upon exterior things, we shall never attain true introversion, nor that unity and

\* Matt. x. 37-8.

† Blossius, *Spiritual Instruction*, cap. ii., section i.



simplicity of spirit which is the immediate disposition for the presence of God in our souls."\*

This detachment and gathering the soul into one can only be attained by constant mortification. "If any man will come after me," says our Lord, "let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily and follow me."† Mortification is just that denial of self and daily bearing of the Cross.

Our Lord Jesus Christ is our example in mortification as in all else; in the sacred Humanity we find perfect detachment, perfect mortification, perfect devotion to the will of God, perfect love of the Father. But He is more than our example, He is our life. St. Paul, in writing to the Colossians of the Christ life, reminds us of this fact, and further that we are here and now "risen with Christ." "If ye then be risen with Christ," he says, "seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God." Seek God and His love and the obedience and joy of heaven. "Set your affections on things above, not on things on the earth." Not only seek God but steadfastly love Him. "For ye are dead and your life is hid with Christ in God." The Christian lives by the risen life of Jesus, but that life is only attained through death to sin and self. "Mortify, therefore, your members which are upon the earth,"‡ You are dead; therefore put to death the old man, the concupiscent longings, the merely earthly desires and loves, because you are living the risen life. There is mortification; the crucifixion of the old man that we may be filled with the life and love of Jesus.

Quite simply, mortification is nothing more nor less than the daily bearing of the Cross. For this reason we can hardly expect it to be popular among unconverted Christians. On the other hand, we must not be surprised if generous souls who long to give themselves wholly to Jesus crucified tend to rush to extremes in their penances. The priest's duty is, in the first case, to do all he can to move his people to the love of God and, in the second, wisely to guide that love that it may grow to perfection.

We must now pass on to consider in what mortification consists. (1) Firstly, it consists in the avoidance of sin and its occasions. Continuance in wilful sin is incompatible with true love of God; consequently any soul that really wishes to love Him, or even one that merely desires to live rightly, will strive to eradicate not only mortal but also venial sin. This is not an easy matter; as we have seen, it involves a very real bearing of the Cross, and severely tempted souls need great encouragement

\* Barbanson, *op cit.*, Part. I., cap. iv.

† Luke ix. 23.

‡ Col. iii. 1 ff.



to persevere. It is so hard to struggle against one's own sinful desires, and so very unromantic that we often long for more interesting and self-sought means of mortification; nevertheless, no soul can be saved without this cross, and there is no point in the spiritual life at which it may be abandoned.

To each soul some sins make more appeal than others, each has its own vulnerable points where self-will must be mortified by self-abandonment, and much of the wearisomeness of the spiritual life is caused by the necessity for continual strife against one particular temptation. Too often this strife is unnecessarily protracted and the soul depressed because it is thought sufficient to go on producing general, unpractical, or merely formal resolutions at intervals, without any clear perception of the cause of the danger or any real attempt at mortification in regard to it. It is useless to go on saying, "I resolve to fight against my besetting sin," if one is neither attempting to build up the opposite virtue nor to discipline the interior irregularities which lead to it.

The mortified soul will seek to discipline itself with regard to its known weaknesses and the sins into which it naturally tends to fall, and it will be found that persevering mortification of one sinful tendency will bring with it the mortification of others as well, and strengthen the character in often unexpected directions. Let us take, for example, a case of chronic bad temper. A person may go on all his life saying, "I resolve not to lose my temper today," and be nothing bettered but rather grow worse. There must be a positive force behind the mortification, the force of a peaceful spirit which must be deliberately cultivated, as though there were no contrary temptation there at all, with prayer and recollection and real desire. It may then be discovered that certain persons "get on one's nerves." It is of no use to argue with a reaction of that kind, one must search for the cause, which is often enough that one is looking at them solely in the light of one's own moods, and not at all from the point of view of God's will; that means mortification of what the old writers called the "irascible appetite." Further examination may reveal the fact that certain people arouse one's anger with great frequency and vehemence, which may lead to the discovery of springs of hitherto unrecognized envy, jealousy, pride, self-will and the like which require deliberate mortification. Thus it may be found that the real remedy against one's bad temper is deliberate mortification of a particular kind of pride, and that the root of the matter is not in one's "nerves" or irascible appetite, but in the mind and the will.

(2) It will thus be seen that particular mortification in regard to sin is of the greatest importance in the spiritual life,



and it leads on to the second form of mortification, which is the general mortification of our "members which are upon the earth."

It is a matter of experience that our whole selves are disorganized and thrown into confusion by concupiscence. If, then, it is to be possible for us to attain to any real unification of this complexity and make any real offering of self to God a general self-discipline of this kind is a necessity.

It should be noticed that the aim of mortification is the *discipline* of the whole soul and not its destruction. We are to put to death, not the soul, which God has created good, or any part of it, but the sinful tendencies of the old man, the concupiscences of fallen nature. We are to root out the desire for self-gratification and plant in its place loving self-surrender to the will of God and the fair flowers of God-regarding virtue.

(a) First of all there is need for the mortification of the senses, which by their disorderly clamour lead the soul to a divided allegiance and many sins. The root of this mortification is simplicity of life and the avoidance of what is merely luxurious and superfluous. This is attained in the Religious Life by the vow of Poverty, by which the religious possesses literally nothing, in obedience to our Lord's command, "Sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come, take up the cross, and follow me."\* It may be thought that this principle is possible only to religious; St. Francis, however, thought otherwise, and proved that he was right by the establishment of his wonderful Third Order, which has done so much for the training of saints and humble followers of Jesus, in the world. The keynote of the spirit and rule of this Order is the following of Christ in self-chosen poverty, yet it has contained kings like St. Louis of France and great landowners like the Lady Giacoma, as well as humble souls like the Curé d'Ars; but the Lady Giacoma administered her family estates as a trust from God and without any thought of personal magnificence, and St. Louis wore a hair-shirt beneath his purple and ermine. The principle of evangelical poverty is essential to the following of Christ. To some it will mean what it meant to the rich young ruler; to others it may mean that far harder thing, the stewardship of riches for the glory of God; to all it means that detachment from created things which we have seen to be fundamental to the Christian life, and constant refusal to cultivate softness of living and to make bodily luxury and self-gratification even minor ends of life. If we would but come back to the following of Jesus in poverty of spirit we should cure, not

\* Mark x. 21.



only the ills of our own souls, but also those of our sick and pleasure-seeking civilization.

It is through the senses that external impressions enter the mind; so, since these impressions are of different kinds, good, bad and indifferent, the use of the senses is in need of mortification. A multitude of sense impressions are constantly clamouring for admission to the soul, but only those to which we pay attention actually find their way within. In the normal course of events our selection of sense impressions is more or less fortuitous. The untrained listener at an orchestral concert hears a great deal of noise going on, but is quite incapable of distinguishing between the trombone part and that of the French horn, though if there should be "a tune" he recognizes it and is happy: out of, say, sixteen sets of noises he has heard, by good fortune, part of one. With the trained musician the case is different; he will be able to keep clear in his mind the lines of the various instruments, or, if he will, follow the movement of a hidden part, say the viola, in its setting as though it had no competitors. Really to listen to music one needs to mortify one's sense of hearing and hear what one needs to hear. The same thing applies to reading a book in a train; in order to accomplish that difficult feat one has to prevent one's eyes from wandering over the landscape, one's ears from taking in one's neighbours' conversation, and, very often, one's nose from being distracted by the pipe of the man opposite. If mortification of the senses is necessary for such very ordinary things as reading and listening to music, it is still more so in the spiritual life, but it is very seldom practised. As we go about we allow our eyes to take in a thousand unnecessary and distractive impressions and then wonder why we get tired and disinclined for any spiritual effort; what is needed is careful custody of the eyes and ears by which we only allow ourselves to attend to those things which concern us.

It may be objected that such custody of the senses leads to lack of observation and absence of mind. This is not so. Observation is not the taking in of any and every impression, but attending to the significant, which involves custody of the senses in regard to the insignificant, and such custody, so far from making the mind absent, renders it more collected.

Custody of the senses is a very real mortification, for it is a direct attack upon concupiscence; for that reason we constantly try to persuade ourselves that it is either undesirable or impossible. Concupiscence of the eyes leads us to uncurbed curiosity, concupiscence of the flesh to worse things; both gain full sway over a soul that has not got its attention under control, hence the importance of this mortification.



Further, St. James tells us that "the tongue is a fire, a world of iniquity,"\* and here we find a further need of mortification. "Especially needful is a guard over the tongue, for it is written that life and death depend upon it. And silence is at once the secret and the safeguard of devotion, innocence and a pure conscience. How much harm is done to the spirit of recollection by unnecessary discourses, idle words, calumny, detraction, murmuring and lies!"† There is little doubt that most people talk far too much and far too carelessly even when they do not consciously speak ill. The love of silence, the habit of speaking as in the presence of God, are great needs, and they can only be attained by careful watchfulness and mortification of speech.

"The servant of God must keep an exceedingly careful watch over his senses. As far as possible he must take care not to use any of his senses for mere self-gratification—that is, not to look at, hear, smell, taste, say or touch anything merely for the pleasure of doing so; and when he has slightly offended in such things he must severely reprove himself. He must not desire to see, hear, smell, taste, speak or touch more or otherwise than God interiorly permits. For if he seeks delight in creatures, he will not be able to find true delight in God."‡

(b) If this exterior mortification of the senses is needful, the interior mortification of the mind and heart is even more so, and we have now to consider this cross. It should be noticed at once that these two forms of mortification go together, neither being complete without the other. St. Vincent de Paul remarks somewhere that interior mortification is the soul of piety, but we must not on that account neglect exterior mortification, without which it is a soul without a body. Simplicity of life and custody of the senses are the outer defences of the castle of the soul and must be securely kept if the castle is to withstand invasion and maintain its loyalty to its Lord; but the keep of the castle is the will, which we must seek to keep whole and entire in its allegiance.

Allegiance to God is shown by a pure intention to love and serve Him in all things, which involves detachment from all things created, and this requires a rigorous interior mortification. It is not enough to keep from overt sin if one is still desiring the forbidden fruit in one's heart; the desire must be mortified as well as the sense, and the will must be kept steady in its love of God. The purpose of interior mortification is to make the will, united with the will of God, master in its own house, and the intellect (by which we understand the higher intuitive faculties as well as the conscious intellectual ones), enlightened by the

\* James iii. 6.

† Barbanson, *op. cit.*

‡ Blossius, *op. cit.*, cap. ii., section ii.



Holy Ghost, the keeper of its conscience. This mortification is nothing less than the continual application of the will of God to the movements of the soul, and it depends on the enlightenment of the intellect by prayer and the strengthening of the will by grace; it is essentially a continuous response to the leading of God, not a self-actuated movement; were it otherwise it would be an impossibility. The interiorly mortified soul intends the will of God in all things, seeks of Him grace to perform His will and guidance thereto. Interior mortification seeks to bring all the powers of the soul into obedience to the will of God that He may do what He will with and in it.

The essence of the matter is the constant intention to abandon at once whatever is evil, dangerous or unnecessary, for the love of God.

(i.) This involves, first of all, mortification of thought. The imagination is constantly at work presenting to the mind thoughts of all kinds; indeed it is probable that the majority of what passes for thought among people with untrained or only partially trained minds is imaginative rather than intellectual, and the imagination is notoriously impatient of control, though it is capable of education. The important matter here is the mortification and unification of interest. It is impossible to prevent wrong suggestions of the imagination, but it is possible to reject them, and such rejection becomes progressively easier as the soul loses interest in them by reason of its increasing interest in the things of God. Therefore St. Paul says: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest (*σεμνά*), whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things."\* But such interest in the things of God implies constant rejection of all imaginings which are contrary or dangerous to them, which is mortification, and such mortification must not be confined to the imagination, but extend also to the intellect. The intellect is easily absorbed by self-interest, warped by prejudice and passion and inflated by pride, and the man of God needs to mortify his mind that he may see all things *sub specie æternitatis*. God asks not only for acute, but also, and chiefly, for consecrated thinking.

(ii.) Perhaps the most essential part of interior mortification is the mortification of desire. Here again we have a movement which begins in the dim instinctive recesses of the soul and surges up into consciousness, bringing with it much disorder. Those natural attractions and aversions with regard to people and causes, fear and hope with regard to the future, instinctive

\* Phil. iv. 8.



depressions, unreasoning anger and the like, which disturb the peace of the soul and drive it into sin—how many souls fall away from God through lack of mortification in such things! How much is the Church weakened by the same cause!

It is essential that the servant of God should realize that his life is supernatural and not merely natural, and that the supernatural life involves a real *ἀπάθεια* with regard to the instinctive desires. The natural desires are essentially self-regarding and need to be subordinated to the love of God by constant mortification. All desires can be sublimated to the love of God, but such sublimation involves a radical mortification of self. Desires must be mortified quickly before they attract to themselves the higher powers of the soul, and their mortification requires constant watchfulness and prayer.

The final interior mortification is that of the judgment. Our life is determined by our judgments; we have to make a judgment on every choice that is offered to us and everything that we consider, but unfortunately we too often regard the faculty of judgment as an automatic part of our soul which does its duty without need of care from us. Too many people believe that what "I think" is right because "I" think it, and it never occurs to them that their judgment may be warped by a multitude of prejudices, imaginations, and desires. We need to realize that our judgment is only right so far as it is consonant with truth and righteousness, or, in other words, with the will of God; we need, therefore, unity with the indwelling Spirit and a rightly informed mind. Here again is room for much mortification; in important judgments we should be sure that we are fully informed about the matter, in all things we should seek deliberation. A momentary pause and lifting of the soul to God before coming to a decision will save the soul from many errors.

(3) The third means of mortification is the acceptance from the hand of God of all the adversities which may happen to us. These range from the little cross accidents of daily life to great trials.

(a) We have been considering various means whereby the unruliness of the soul may be mortified; we now come to that whereby everything that happens to the soul in its earthly pilgrimage may be a means of purification and union with Jesus.

All pain may be a means of such purification and union, but it does not necessarily follow that all pain is that. A painful disease, for instance, may be the means of complete purification of a soul and a real share in the Passion whereby one is allowed to "fill up that which is behind (*τὰ ὑστερήματα*) of the afflictions



of Christ,"\* but it may also be the occasion of grave selfishness and rebellion against God. All depends on the intention of the soul: the mortified soul will accept its pain with joy, or at least fortitude; the unmortified soul will resist and resent it with all its might.

Eliphaz the Temanite remarked that "Man is born unto trouble as the sparks fly upward."† This saying is capable of great exaggeration, and, if regarded apart from the love of God, may lead to pronounced pessimism; nevertheless it is true. God tests the soul daily by pain, not in order that He may hurt it (such a view of God is unworthy to the last degree), but that He may purify it and give it somewhat to offer to Him in union with Jesus crucified. Religion is essentially the offering of the soul to God, not the gaining of happiness from Him, though the way of faithfulness leads to eternal joy; but the soul is bankrupt, it is nothing and has nothing save what God made and gave it; by sin it has made itself unworthy even to approach God. But God gives it through the Precious Blood firstly pardon and then grace and then pain, that it may itself be crucified with Christ and have "somewhat to offer" in union with its Lord.

The statement that our pilgrimage through this world is a way of daily pain seems to some people profoundly depressing and to others unhealthily exaggerated, but in truth it is neither. The thought of the suffering of pain is always depressing to the selfish and unmortified, as well as to the well-meaning but ignorant soul. So long as pain is meaningless, it is the most terrifying fact in the world; but to the Christian it should not be meaningless. So long as our best energies are devoted to having what we call "a good time," so long will the thought of pain depress; but the moment we face the love and will of God and try lovingly to accept and offer the pain He gives, then "perfect love casteth out fear."

There are people who enjoy bad health with an enthusiasm worthy of a better cause; similarly in the spiritual sphere there are those who would have us believe that life is nothing else than pain of the most crushing kind, so they go through life wrapped in a gentle melancholy.

Such a view is wickedly exaggerated; the spiritual life is one of joy which at times is intense and leads to a joy which shall be eternal, and pain, even when crushing or prolonged, is ancillary to joy. Our blessed Lord was truly "a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief"; but that was not all, it was "for the joy that was set before Him" that He "endured the cross, despising the shame." Pain is neither the whole of life nor an end in itself, but it is our daily trial.

\* Col. i. 24.

† Job v. 7.



Some people, mostly superficial folk in easy circumstances, take a directly opposite view to that which we have just criticized, and regard pain as an occasional intruder into a life which is predominantly happy. Incidentally, such people have but to exercise a little imagination with regard to others less happily situated than themselves to be convinced of the inadequacy of such a view; but, leaving that consideration on one side, it is essential for our purpose to realize that there are many kinds and degrees of pain. In the physical sphere pain may be occasional or chronic, general or localized, subdued or acute, an ache or a stab; in the spiritual sphere pain is similarly diverse, and when one says that pain is the daily trial of the soul, one has in mind pain in its widest connotation. We may suffer in any part of our complex being, from a great variety of causes, and in very various degrees of intensity. God gives us physical pain, but not always; grief is an occasional and dreaded visitant; the great spiritual trial of apparent separation from the Beloved tests the love of interior souls; but these great sufferings are not all. No day passes without those minor pains which are none the less searching for being what we call small. The little cross accidents of life, trying, stupid, or bad-tempered people, minor hardships, anxieties, irksome occupations, little ailments, interruptions, "pin-pricks," and the thousand other small things which wound self-love and against which one's natural tendency is to rebel, are all pains, as well as the burden of the world's sin which lies so heavily upon the hearts of Christ's lovers.

There is no lack of pain in daily life, and the more sensitive and Christlike a soul becomes, by so much the more does its pain increase in depth and intensity.

"Properly speaking, there is nothing either little or great with regard to the things of God. Everything that bears the impress of His will is great, however small it may be in itself."\* The little pains of everyday life as well as the great pains, which are of less frequent occurrence, are sent or permitted by God as His means of fashioning the soul into His likeness. Consider the art of the sculptor. He takes a rough and unfashioned block of marble, neither beautiful nor shapely, but with potential beauty; with a chisel he cuts away a good deal of his marble, and out of what is left fashions a statue. If one were entirely ignorant of the process and the end in view, one would say that this cutting-away process was wasteful and meaningless, but in fact every blow of the mallet is designed to produce a particular effect, to form a certain part of the work of art, and when at last the statue is finished it stands forth in all the beauty of the marble, a perfect expression of its maker's thought.

\* Grou, *Manual for Interior Souls*, p. 115.



That is a parable of the discipline of pain. The soul at the beginning is rough and unfashioned, but its end is to be the perfect expression of the thought of God. This end is attained by pain, by the blows of the mallet and the cutting of the chisel; but this pain is not fortuitous, for every part of it is co-ordinated to the end in view. So, sometimes by heavy blows, more often by light ones, the process goes on, while the statue, now in one part and now in another, begins to show forth the thought of God, until at last, if not in this life, certainly in the next, it is fashioned into His image.

As with all parables, there is a point in this similitude at which it ceases to be adequate, for marble is, by reason of its nature, both passive and insensible, whereas the soul is neither. The fashioning of the soul into the image of God demands a response if it is to be effective, the constant intention of accepting all pains, whether great or small, as from the hands of God, that thereby self-will may be mortified and the soul more and more wholly abandoned to the will of God.

This mortification is one of the great tests of true spirituality. There are many people who "seem to be religious," who, nevertheless, are constantly complaining over the slightest discomforts and render all about them unhappy by their minor selfishnesses. Such people are lovers of self and not of God, and for that reason their religion, tried by the touchstone of mortification, is vain. Others desire, or believe they desire, extraordinary mortifications which lie outside their state of life, but make little attempt to accept those lesser ones (or apparently lesser ones) which God sends them within it; that is pure self-will and a sign, not of devotion, but of lack of true mortification. They are like those folk, against whom Spurgeon inveighed, who sing lustily,

"Were the whole realm of nature mine,  
That were an offering far too small,"

what time they search their pockets for the least valuable coin they can find to put in the collection bag.

This way of mortification is most precious, for it is the work of God Himself; it involves no straining of desire after ways which are not ours, for it lies wholly within that state of life into which God has called us. It leads the soul to place its whole will and desire in the hands of God, for it is not self-imposed, and therefore accomplishes, if we will, just what He wants, which is all that matters.

(b) In discussing this way of mortification we have, so far, indicated only exterior pains; but it should be realized that God also disciplines the soul by interior pain, which the mortified soul must learn to accept and offer. Some souls, especially



beginners, are but little tried in this way; but as the soul advances God commonly sends it spiritual desolations and trials that it may be drawn to love Him for Himself apart from any joy or gifts that He may give it. At the beginning of its course the soul commonly experiences fervent happiness, but this is subsequently withdrawn, and the soul learns, if it does not fall away, to go on with very little sensible consolation in prayer, and frequently has to face shorter or longer periods of time when its prayer is just hard work with no apparent movement from God at all. Later on perhaps it may be called to undergo real desolation, so that it cries out with its Lord, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" All these things are the deepest pain, but, when they are not the result of sin, they should be accepted as the most searching means of mortification, for by them God is leading the soul from sensible to truly spiritual devotion, from love of His gifts to love of Himself, from the darkness of light to the light of darkness.

In setting itself to accept with joy these God-given spiritual mortifications, the soul should root itself deeply in the soil of faith. God may lead one into a dark room where one can neither see nor touch Him and may have, apparently, little attraction towards Him; nevertheless, one does desire Him or one would not feel the lack of fervent love, and He has not withdrawn Himself from one, though one has no sensible perception of His Presence; one must be content to suffer that His will may be done, confident that this most intimate cross will work His will in us more effectively and more costingly than any other.

It may be well to remark that not all souls are tried by God in this way; indeed, some souls seem to attain to a considerable degree of sanctity without, apparently, suffering very severe spiritual trials. God has His own purposes with regard to each soul—some He leads by one way, some by another—but it is well that devout souls should know that spiritual suffering of one kind or another is almost inevitable at some periods of spiritual advance, and so not be taken by surprise when and if such trials occur to themselves. The soul should strive to be detached from spiritual joy as from other sources of self-satisfaction, and be ready to give itself peacefully into the hands of God should He remove it.

(4) There is yet one more way of mortification, which differs from all the rest in one important respect—namely, that it is wholly voluntary; it is a cross of devotion and not of necessity. This way includes all austerities and penances which the soul imposes upon itself for the love of God.

We have considered the ordinary ways of mortification by



which the soul becomes purified and united with our Lord: the detachment of the will from all things created in order that it may be perfectly obedient to the will of God; the mortification of the inordinate movements of the senses, heart and mind by discipline; the acceptance of every pain which God sends as a means of mortification and union. In the lives of the saints we find a further and even more radical mortification in suffering raised to the heroic level, terrific austerities voluntarily undertaken, and prayer to God for the quintessence of suffering.

The austerity of the saints is a fact which flames across the history of the Church and which should be faced by serious souls, and, like all such facts, it either repels or attracts powerfully. Many souls are so repelled by the austerities of the saints that they throw over all idea of mortification of any kind; others, fewer in number, are moved by a sentimental and morbid interest in suffering to desire to emulate the saints in this matter; others again, and these are very few, are moved to heroic austerity because the hand of God is upon them and they cannot do otherwise.

We are mainly concerned with the first two classes, and into both we should seek to instil a little humility and respect for hard facts. The austerities of the saints are the austerities of the saints, but these souls are as yet far from sanctity, and the ways of advanced spirituality are, as yet, "far above out of their sight." Souls which are repelled by these austerities need to realize the intense beauty of sanctity as revealed in those who are likest Jesus, and to learn that such beauty of soul is only attained and maintained by means of mortification which, for themselves, means the ordinary ways which we have considered.

It is right that souls which desire to love God should be attracted by the saints, who are His friends, but they must realize that they are not themselves saints, and that they have to learn to love God within the limits of their own capacity and state of life: it is rash in the extreme for a soul living in the world, possibly married, with a husband and children to care for, to emulate the austerities of a Carmelite nun because St. Teresa used and counselled such austerities. The call to self-imposed suffering seldom comes in the early stages of the spiritual life. "The desire of doing and suffering great things," says Père Grou, "is very often, indeed almost always, an illusion of self-love and an effort of presumption. 'I should like to practise great austerities, like such and such a saint; I should like to bear great crosses': this is all pride, all vain-glory. The saints never formed such desires. Now, what happens to us when we do? We try of our own will to perform great austerities; then our fervour cools down, and we give them up; then some very



ordinary crosses present themselves to us, and the soul, which thought it could bear such great things, finds it cannot bear the very smallest."\*

Pride, self-will and presumption—these are hard words, but true of the souls which the great director had in mind. It is pride in this matter to say that what the saints have done I will do. We should indeed desire the heroic virtue of the saints—would to God it were more desired!—but the more whole-heartedly we desire it the more clearly we shall see our own glaring failures in the ordinary ways of love, and fear to lay hold of the sufferings of the saints before we have learned to mortify ourselves in lesser ways. The saints undertook greater austerities not because they were less mortified than we are, but because they had learned what we are but striving after—the complete obedience of self to the will of God—and could therefore proceed to greater lengths in the extermination of self-love than the ordinary soul dreams of. No soul should dare to take up extraordinary mortifications until it has gone very far in the ordinary ones.

We must here guard against a misconception. The Religious Life is a life of mortification voluntarily undertaken; are we therefore to say that only advanced souls have a call thereto? Such a statement would be manifestly absurd; we must distinguish. God calls souls to the Religious Life at all stages of spiritual advance; it is a call to a complete renunciation of the world and to a life of voluntary mortification, but, the surrender once made, the austerities of the Religious Life are not extraordinary to the Religious, however much they might be so to the ordinary Christian, but are incidental to his state and rule and therefore are part of our third means of mortification. There is a sharp line of division between the cloister and the world here.

It may seem strange to say that a desire for pain is due to self-will, but so in some cases it is. It is often noticeable that souls who desire to practise voluntary austerities of various kinds are singularly impatient of the little crosses of everyday life, a sure sign of self-will. Some souls, of an unhealthy and sentimental tendency, make a real cult of pain, magnifying the most ordinary sufferings into mystical ones and believing themselves to be victim souls when they are only beginning to be purified; so they become self-absorbed and, instead of falling deeper in love with God, they make an idol of their own imaginings. That is self-will of a most subtle and dangerous kind. The saints who, being thoroughly purged, really did suffer with Jesus for the sins of the world, did not contemplate themselves

\* *Manual for Interior Souls*, p. 117.



suffering; pain, especially imaginary pain, was not the centre of their universe, their sacrifice of self was complete, being actuated only by the costing love of Jesus and compassion for the world.

A further mark of self-will which is not altogether unknown is the refusal either to ask or accept direction in the matter of voluntary austerities. It is quite certain that no voluntary austerities should be practised unless permission has been asked and obtained from one's Confessor and his ruling has been accepted without argument. Souls of the kind we have in mind frequently think they know better than their Confessor, and, if he refuses to allow them to do whatever they like, decide at once that he does not understand them, and absolve themselves from obedience on that account. The ruling of the Confessor on a matter of this kind must be accepted as the will of God, and independence or contempt is a sure sign of self-will.

The desire for extraordinary mortification is presumptuous when it arises from the notion that the ordinary ways by which God mortifies the soul are insufficient and therefore one must do something about it oneself. Such a notion is only possible to an unmortified soul, and is itself a sure sign that it is not ready for voluntary mortifications, but it is not uncommon. Perhaps a woman living at home in the world disregards the sufferings of her state and longs to be an enclosed religious, though in fact she has no vocation to that state; she then decides to adopt certain exterior mortifications of the religious life, hoping thereby to become "a religious in the world"; but the unexpected result is that she becomes "difficult," her home is spoiled and her health injured because she tries, quite unsuccessfully, to combine two entirely dissimilar manners of life with a marked contempt for one of them. God had intended her to find her mortification in a life to which He had called her, but which she did not desire; she tried to mortify herself by imitating the life which she did desire and despising the mortifications of God. Nothing could be more foolishly presumptuous, but it happens and is sometimes encouraged by directors.

In writing thus we do not mean to suggest that the way of voluntary mortifications is proper only to canonized saints and that no ordinary souls are called to it, still less do we wish to discourage the completest self-oblation and the love of heroic virtue; but it is necessary to point out that voluntary mortifications undertaken by those who have no call to them, and from any but the purest motives, so far from being acts of divine love, militate against it.

Directors of souls need to exercise the greatest care in the discernment of spirits in this matter. It is necessary to be quite sure of one's ground before one gives permission for any



extraordinary mortifications, and it will do the soul no harm to be kept waiting for a while. If its desire is of God it will certainly persist; if it is self-initiated it may evaporate. A hasty decision will probably be found afterwards to have been wrong. The type of soul we have criticized is often very deceptive. Such people frequently read books written for souls of quite a different kind, and believe themselves to be far more advanced than they are; they have acquired a way of talking which may beguile an inexperienced director into agreeing with them, and not infrequently there is real, if misguided, piety behind their desires. It is necessary to look for signs by which we may know the soul that is really called to mortifications of devotion.

In the first place, we should expect to find great strictness of life in that state in which the soul finds itself combined with a considerable measure of interior mortification. Secondly, we should look for an ardent love of Jesus crucified, leading to a loving desire to share His Cross in all mortifications, small as well as great, for the secret of mortification is not the love of pain but the love of Jesus—it has no meaning apart from Him. Thirdly, the sure call of God is essential, and brings this way of mortification into line with the rest. Père Grou says, truly but unexpectedly, “The saints never formed such desires”; yet they performed the austerities, and they were self-inflicted. In truth the mortifications of the saints were not self-inflicted. God asked, the saint gave; the mortification was not his desire, the will of God was his desire; the baptism wherewith his Lord was baptized not infrequently caused him a hard struggle, and therefore he was able to be baptized with it. So, truly, the great mortifications are not self-inflicted but God-inflicted, and are the necessary response of the soul to the love that will not be denied; they are not sought but given. The fourth sign is a proof of this, and is complete candour with and obedience to the director. To the soul that Jesus calls to share His Cross in this voluntary way, it is sorrow unspeakable to be kept back from that drinking of the cup of His Passion; but it is willing to bear even this, and suffer for Him in another way, rather than give way in the slightest degree to self-will.

Mortification in all its forms is the irresistible outcome of the love of Jesus, as is well brought out by Dr. Moberley in his profound book on the Atonement, and we would close with his quiet yet moving words.

“It is difficult,” he says, “for our imagination to emphasize too strongly what the meaning would be of ‘being in love with’ Christ, crucified and risen; or to how much it would be the practical key in the way of the translation of the spirit of Calvary into the animating spirit of individual



Christian life. What engrossing of faculties, what absorption of desire, what depth of thought, what wistfulness of kindness, what strength of will, what inspiration of power—to endeavour or to endure—would forthwith follow, with spontaneous, silent, irresistible sequence, if once we were 'in love'!

"So all-inclusive indeed is the meaning of love, that it is needless to distinguish from love, as though it were a separable point, the effort of personal imitation and approach. Consciously or unconsciously, love is imitative. What I am really in love with I must in part be endeavouring to grow like, and shall be growing like, if the love is really on fire, even more than I consciously endeavour. What I am really in love with characterizes *me*. It is that which I, so far, am becoming. *In* love then, at least, though perhaps not separably from love, there is much imitation, conscious and unconscious, of the Spirit which revealed itself to the world on Calvary. There may be no inherent beauty in asceticism. There may be no form of asceticism which is not, sometimes, the product of mean and selfish impulses; which does not, sometimes, draw justly upon itself the condemnation, and even contempt, of healthy consciences. But alas for us if we cannot also, in this context, see how directly the ascetic spirit may be the irresistible outcome of pure love! The daily unselfishness—more and more smiling and spontaneous—the quiet stringency and gladness of detailed self-discipline—do we not see how this, as the unconscious, or the conscious, imitation of the Cross, by one who is in love with the Crucified, may be just the natural homage, the relief which *will* not be denied, of a devoted love, welling up and bubbling over in act? Be it what it may as cold self-conscious rule, at least as the expression and relief of overflowing love, asceticism, even the exactest, is not only blameless but beautiful. It is also, in very large measure, a practical token of the thing we are looking for: a secret of the process of the real translation of Calvary, contemplated *and loved*, into the inmost characterizing reality of the spirit of the loving worshipper."\*

F. P. HARTON.

## THE TRANSFORMATION OF MEDIAEVALISM

IN the last forty years, and in fact since the time when Sir Charles Oman wrote his first history book, we have altered our point of view with regard to the Middle Ages, and indeed to history itself. We look no longer for a record of events, nor see their import in an insular perspective. We seek rather, as recent studies show,† to figure to ourselves life as it was lived, and in doing so we see that it was governed by a system of profound ideas more complete than that of any period of Europe's long development. The interests of the age of Pericles were revived, and men attempted to work them out, not in a single city, but

\* R. C. Moberley, *Atonement and Personality*, pp. 147-148.

† *The Mediæval Village*, by G. C. Coulton. Cambridge University Press. *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*. Oxford University Press. *English Mediæval Glass*, by Herbert Read. Putnam, £5 5s.



over the whole of western Christendom, which, in spite of the difficulties of distance, was still unified by the Church. The Church, in fact, was the acknowledged mistress of life, and her chiefs attempted the august task which the confidence of her children imposed on them. Every range of human activity came, therefore, into her economy. *The Legacy of the Middle Ages* is the record of an attempt at organizing society as a vast Christian institution.

The attempt would at any time have been daring, and at that time it might well have been called audacity. Crime was a common habit, even the organized societies of cities engaged in rivalries that easily became violent, the outward amenities of life were uncommon, communication was difficult, and travel dangerous. Terrible diseases would sweep over vast tracts, barbarism encroached from every corner on Christendom and left its influence on every type of character, lasciviousness and cruelty were never thought surprising, and then, as always, the vices of men found a field in every means by which they sought to fortify their virtues. We live now in a material age: we have, indeed, as Disraeli argued, mistaken comfort for civilization: physical well-being is considered by all essential, and by most sufficient: we calmly contemplate shocking inequalities in society. "The ghastly smooth life, dead at heart," is gladly accepted for the travail of the issues imaged for the soul and known by the feelings in their intenser life; but with all these, the knowledge of our worst can still permit us to be horrified by the iniquities of the Middle Ages as well as by their attempt to apply St. Paul's directions as to saving the soul by torturing or destroying the body. Even in our own age, however, we saw among barbarities on a scale that far exceeded anything in the Middle Ages the growth of the minor and greater qualities; for these never show their supremacy more clearly than when they take no thought for comfort. Precisely for this reason did the Middle Ages leave us so large a legacy, and in a type of investment which—inherited in smaller quantities from other benefactors—must be developed if we would ensure our own prosperity.

At least as far back as the time of the Eleatics, reason had postulated another reality than that of the senses: in the relation of that reality to the experience of sense philosophy was absorbed, and is so still. The question was at the heart of mediæval life in Europe, for that life was, as we have said, reason's venture for governance. To Plato the world was but a shadow: and from the time of St. Paul onwards a profound distrust of temporal advantages, and of the life of the senses, had mingled with the central Christian ambition of making



human society into a city of God. But the rediscovery of Aristotle brought back the stress on to the other aspect of Christianity, and the outward world was seen as something very different from a snare. It was, indeed, the very means of knowledge as the body was the instrument of the soul. The Church herself insisted in her every ordinance that matter was to be made the vehicle of spirit, and to the good man all life became a sacrament. What the Dominicans were developing out of Aristotle, the Franciscans drew from an impulse of spontaneous love. The creatures of the outward world were welcomed as a company of friends given by God, and almost as beneficent as angels.

They were so, however, only because of their Giver and as a means of communion with Him. The proviso was at the heart of the greatness of the Middle Ages, and when it was obscured their system broke down. Their problem, in other words, was to adjust experience to an ultimate reality; and they did so by arguing that the ultimate reality is the Divine mind which generates real ideas; that these inform matter, and give it their own ideal form, known as their substantial form or simply as their substance; and that this form or substance becomes the mind's means of communion with reality when it is abstracted by the mind from the particulars of experience known through the senses. As long as the mind can perform this work of abstraction reason becomes intuitive, and the mind finds nothing so real as patterns of perfection. Life is taken into a spiritual existence and moves among metaphysical truths which are also mystical truths; it finds these in its contact with the exterior world, as well as in the conduct of affairs. Central among those truths were the documents and ordinaries of the Church, which were accepted as the words of eternal life. The authority of reason and its intuition were completed by another light, the light of faith, a light immortal, holy, blessed, and all divine. Such a light gave men final security, and the walls of faith's city were salvation: in it all that existed was a harmony, and to walk in its ways was that *justitia* which we best translate as righteousness, and which means a precise sense of obligations. This was to be applied in the giving of just wages and the application of a just price. It employed a complex system of mutual loyalties which provided safety for the poor in return for their work and effort; it led up from manor to shire, and from shire to monarchy. Even in towns, as the *Polychronicon* shows, it implied a thorough adjustment of rights to services, and a city was still a social unity. Between one nation and another differences were to be adjusted by a central power, which was, according to some, a supreme monarchy, divinely established,



which was, according to others, to be the authority of the Church organized so that the whole of society should be subject to the arbitration and the guidance of the Church's central court voiced in the person of her head. But the object in either case was universal peace established on law. Thus organized in a loyalty to a faith which at every issue of life harmonized the unseen and the seen, the world itself was to be a mirror of the City of God. So life in the world was to be a citizenship, free because each could express his own will in completing the complex development of society, which he contentedly recognized as the proper subject of his ordered loyalties. This is the august design worked out in masterly treatises by Hugh of St. Victor, by John of Salisbury, by St. Thomas Aquinas. They all viewed life as a potentiality for reason to mould through the will to a social and spiritual end, which was religious. Their aim, in fact, was very like that of the architects of the Gothic cathedrals or the designers of their stained glass. It was the same high and conscious instinct in Jean de Montereau, in Dante, in Simon de Montfort, in Vincent de Beauvais, and Jacques de Voragine. It was the object of the activity of striving parties which resulted in Magna Charta and the Parliamentary system as well as the Crusades. For through it all ran the impulse of excitement: the tense nervous energy of Gothic architecture, the keen "pitch" of the colours in their glass, which, as Mr. Lethaby has said, "stimulate the sensibilities like an exultant anthem," prove the passion, the vitality, the keenness with which they lived, and which was essential to the completeness with which they worked out their subtle and comprehensive theories. Economics, politics, ethics, and art were all subordinated to their metaphysics and exalted to their mystical religion. "The purpose of man," wrote Aquinas, "is not merely that man should live virtuously, but that he should come to the enjoyment of God." So neat a statement expresses the order which the Latins kept in all their mysticism; but we see it expressed also in thoughts typical of Germany, what Carlyle was to call "deep thinking" by Meister Eckhart: "The soul's lower power should be ordered to her higher, and her higher ones to God; her outward senses to the inward, and the inward to reason; thought to intuition, and intuition to the will; and all to unity so that the soul may be alone, with nothing flowing into her but sheer divinity flowing here into herself." Conceptions in which metaphysics became mysticism were everywhere worked out in minute detail to the harmonious wholeness of the complex ordered structure of busy thought on the grand scale.

Such a conception, as we said, might be called not less than



a discovery in comparison with the misconceptions and the ignorance in histories of forty years ago, and we are under an immense debt to those who have won back for us our inheritance from the Middle Ages. We must now guard against an undue enthusiasm for mediæval achievement. In fact, we do not really appreciate what that achievement is till we have defined it in relation to what it left undone, and so seen why its magnificent projects were first superseded and then actually forgotten.

It was first, one must repeat, an age of contrasts. Religion was a great power, but strong also were the instincts of barbarism, which left their unmistakable traces in the cathedrals, in the Crusades, and in the persecutions of heretics, as indeed in all forms of violence and punishment. When we look more nearly at these, we see that many of them were closely associated with doubts of the security of life; anything which appeared to endanger life, and life eternal, could occasion the hysteria of panic. The task of organizing society, which began by being ill-educated, and which, therefore, was incapable of enjoying freedom, led necessarily to all those exertions of authority which could easily become tyranny. Rulers and feudal lords had immense temptations of ambition, which were the more insidious because men in authority were believed to be placed in it as agents by the divine government of the world. The clergy were themselves men of the most varied capacities and characters, and were themselves subject, through their better education, to the temptations of leaders. Society itself was restless, and the growth and emancipation of industrial life, with its guilds and its power to make towns, was undermining the manorial and feudal systems. Wars, either between cities or provinces, or between kings, would disorganize and demoralize the people. The intellectual activity, which found a field in endless disputations, created a feeling of uncertainty and tended to distract men from the practical application or refinement of profound principles to an arbitrary subtlety which brought the whole of scholasticism into disrepute as "an elaborate and exquisite ignorance." The Papacy itself had not defined either its status or its policy. Its large exactions left the inevitable grudge in remote countries; even the statesmanlike reforms of Gregory VII. or Innocent III. were insufficient to safeguard the clergy from those powers of worldliness and enmity which for decades kept the Papacy itself in dispute. When the Popes returned from Avignon they were absorbed in the humanist movement, and were never able to uphold the immense position which was accorded to them in 1439 by the Council of Florence, which, going far beyond the Vatican Council of 1870, defined the Pope without qualifications as the teacher and father



of Christians and the Vicar of Christ on earth. Each of the great orders of monks and friars had in turn become corrupt; and the clergy often gave excuses for a distrust of religion, and through all the very triumph of Christianity, as at the conversion of Constantine, meant that it was weakened by the temper of its adherents. These often feared the powers of the devil much more than they trusted in the Almighty, and shared with the zealous an impatience with cranks and heretics. Indeed, we do wrong to think that the mediæval mind was so very different from our own. We must remember that, as Professor Powicke has excellently put it, "We moderns are descended from these people, and our paganism, in so far as it is unsophisticated, is the paganism of our forefathers, less crude and violent, but equally natural, equally consistent with a life of Christian conformity, which begins with baptism and closes with the solemn commitment of the body to the grave and the soul to the keeping of God. By paganism I mean a state of acquiescence, or merely professional activity, unaccompanied by sustained religious experience and inward discipline. It is not a state of vacancy or scepticism. It is confined to no class of persons, and is not hostile to, though it is easily wearied by, religious observance. It accepts what is offered without any sense of responsibility, has no sense of sin, and easily recovers from twinges of conscience. At the same time, it is full of curiosity and is easily moved by what is now called the group-mind. It is sensitive to the activities of the crowd, is often emotional, and can be raised to those moods of passion, superstition, and love of persecution into which religion, on its side, can degenerate. A mediæval, like a modern, man remained a Christian because he was born a Christian, and most mediæval Christians were probably men of this kind—not a few popes, cardinals, bishops, monks, friars, and parish clergy, and a large number of the clerks who had no cure of souls."

No word of this long citation can be foregone; in fact, it needs an addition. For very often the feelings of a party or the intoxication of an egoist assumed the names of religion, and the assertiveness of a doubtful principle was made with the force and fervour which were proper to the sublime names it abrogated. There is a type of conservative paganism, associated sometimes with slothful minds, sometimes with vested interests, sometimes with mere self-glorification, which states its case not only with the passion, but in the very terms of fanaticism, and which really believes it is Christianity.

Then, too, as now, freedom was very largely identified with property, for the closeness of relations between civil society and the idea of property was duly recognized. Nowadays we allow



property to be regulated by those who have none, which is not a prudent economy. The Middle Ages went to the other extreme, and the country labourer was more like a slave. But the principles which guided the Middle Ages pointed towards freedom, and if Mr. Coulton is vague in saying that "the greatness of those ages was less in their actual achievements than in their perpetual struggles," it is certainly true that the struggles which they made to rise to the level of the achievements of saint or genius proved that the spirit of life animated the people as a whole, and gave to their greatest work the tension and keenness which is peculiar to its greatness.

In an age of violent reactions, asceticism was not an inspiring answer to grossness and cruelty. The discipline of the regular has left its masterpiece in *De Imitatione Christi*, which indeed reflects the dominant tone of mediæval piety. "The kingdom of God is within thee," it pleads. "Turn with all thy heart to the Lord, and leave this wretched world, and thy soul will find rest. Learn to despise outward things and to give thyself to inward things, and thou wilt see the kingdom of God coming within thee. . . . All His glory and beauty are from within, and there He takes His delight. Frequent are His visitings with the inward man, sweet His converse, grateful His consolations, deep His peace, and His intimacy wonderful exceedingly." Such is the promise made to the chosen, but they are the minority. Even within the religious orders the mystics were few; and the religious orders, furthermore, were armoured with the vows of poverty, obedience and chastity. It is worth while considering why. The tension and stress of the moral life is the adjustment of standards to circumstances. To accommodate enthusiasm and enterprise to the needs of others and to the economy of production; to live in decency and beauty; to have reserves of property and therefore of power and freedom, and yet not to become obsessed with what Whitman called "the mania of owning things"; to recognize that joy is the rightful portion of the wholeness of man's nature while yet keeping oneself from the egoism of the voluptuary—these are the balance and rhythm which turn life to art's perfection, but which are always being disturbed by those great demands on human nature made by pleasure, by material gain, and by the instinct of self-assertion. The religious orders aimed at their own spiritual emancipation by silencing these demands. While the world at large shivered at the hint of self-denial, these felt the exhilaration of the plunge; a ready leap gives the diver his reward, while others feel both loss of dignity and the smart of smacking water. The religious orders specialized on the highest



standard, and, in spite of innumerable failures, the Middle Ages were the better for it.

But the life of the orders did not solve the larger and more absorbing problem in which the developed ideals of their great thinkers involved the age. We might sum up the question in the relation of sense experience to the metaphysics of mysticism. "Are we, then, also to be strong by following the natural fact?" asked Val d'Arno, and all men of common sense answered with him, "Yes, assuredly." It is the growth of loyalty to the natural fact which outlines the evolution of the art of the Middle Ages into that of the Renaissance. Niccolo Pisano took a hint for it from the classics, and Giotto went direct to nature's living images. This artistic enterprise accompanied that conviction of the lovableness of creation which St. Francis preached. And it received support from the subtle genius of the great Franciscan philosopher, Johannes Duns Scotus. Duns perceived that the will has a certain power over the flow and the distinctness of our thoughts as they emerge, and this caused him to put the faculties of choice and love above those of reason and contemplation.

But another tendency was at work: it was the tendency to regard reason not as "an energy radiated from the heart of intuitive conviction, but as the unbridled activity of the human brain." The result was that abstract reality was questioned, and in the work of William of Ockham, a hundred years and more later than that of Duns, we see the disintegration of the whole great structure of mediæval thought. Platonism was indeed revived in Florence at the same time, and as shown alike by Spenser and by Michelangelo the great metaphysical tradition kept its hold upon the subtlest minds. The doctrine that all outward things were but semblances of an inward and eternal reality keeps informing all philosophy, all art, all literature, both in the East and in the West. But the subtler point on which the validity of that doctrine hangs is the relation of the exterior world to that other reality which is enduring. Aristotle himself left this point obscure; Aquinas, as we showed, came far nearer pointing out the triple development of reality from the ideas of perfection in the Divine mind through the substance of outward things to their life in the human mind. But how the mind perceives this reality, what importance the outward fact bears to that reality, and finally why the Divine mind clothed the patterns of perfection in the images of nature, scholastic philosophy omitted to explain.

The omission left its tremendous structure fragile. Experience has an intrinsic power; we do indeed gain strength from natural facts, from things which we have seen. It is, in fact, in



the relation of the emotions to the physical life that we find the strongest impulse that moves human nature. It is not only the strongest: it is the most mysterious, the most mystical. The body itself has a magic that sways the soul; and the whole claim and system of the mediæval Church insisted upon it in relation to her own life. But this was a mystery only for mystical natures to accept, not defined for reason; neither was it stated in relation to life as a whole. The great achievements of the Middle Ages were never open to inspection in the good light of common day; and physical life, which is both too intimate and too powerful to be denied, set up a spirituality of her own. The worth and permanence of what was good in the Middle Ages will depend on whether or not nature's claims when most exactly stated find, between their loftiness and those of mediæval concepts, a mutual aid for a piercing of the heights and depths. Christianity needs to adopt into her system the philosophies of experience which have followed the Renaissance with the same thoroughness as she adopted classical humanism; each should find in her system their logical, their inevitable conclusion.

When historians consider the Middle Ages they rid themselves with difficulty of denominational prepossessions. The fact that the mediæval Church has an unbroken succession with all that is now united to Rome, which cherishes so many of her institutions and her ways, has made many identify mediæval religion with contemporary Catholicism. But here we need to be exact. During the fifteenth century the Church was making a feeble stand against paganism, and the Reformation, in its very varied forms, was not so much a revolt against Catholicism as against paganism. If this is true of Lutheranism, it is obviously truer of the counter-Reformation. Humanism, which menaced the Church's spiritual life, brought it also a saner vitality. By softening the sharp distinction which the Middle Ages had drawn between the saint and the standards of the world, the reformers in their individualism, which later ages exaggerated, did much to elevate the tone of society. And those who like St. Ignatius Loyola, St. Philip Neri, and St. François de Sales set up the standards of holiness for men in the world did a work still more necessary than that of the saints of the Middle Ages. When we realize the deficiencies of the fifteenth century, we indeed must praise, and not abuse, the Jesuits. The Calvinists were attempting the same reform in another way. The Rome of the Renaissance, both in its internal government and in its function in international diplomacy, became far more efficient. Perhaps it was no wonder if for a time even the Eternal City seemed to forget the past. Life was to become yet more absorbing, more triumphant; but it was



still to need metaphysics, mysticism, the faith of the Church. It is still one with the mediævalism which it has inevitably transformed into something yet more rich and strange. But the transformation was continuous; unbroken was the unity of history; and indeed to finish the work of the thirteenth century is the very task which, with the help of these studies, is now being set for the twentieth.

R. E. GORDON GEORGE.



## MISCELLANEA

### NOTES AND COMMENTS

WE have received a copy of an unusual and most attractive blank-verse poem by Dr. Scott-Moncrieff, the Vicar of Buxton, entitled *The Symphony of Life* (Blackwell, 1s. net), which we hope will be as widely read as it deserves. The Prologue introduces us to a country vicar in the Peak district, whose hobby is his piano; and the poem that follows represents his philosophy of life. And what a fine, rich philosophy it is! The different kinds of Reality, Time and Space, Emergent Evolution, Sin and Evil, the Incarnation—all these high problems are passed before us in verse that is both lucid and melodious. We find ourselves often reminded of two great masters of philosophical verse, Lucretius and Robert Bridges; while the theme of music at the heart of reality has, of course, a great place in English poetry from Milton and Dryden onwards. And when this theme is combined, as it is here, with the great truths of Christian doctrine, the result is a piece of work at once instructive and delightful.

The death of Dr. Söderblom, Archbishop of Uppsala, removes a notable figure from the ecclesiastical stage of Europe. Not only was he a ripe scholar, particularly in the realms of anthropology and philosophy, but he had a large vision of Christendom and its meaning; and no one has done more than he to permeate Continental Protestantism with a renewed faith in the unity of the Church. Fr. Hebert's Note, published below, on the recent Conference of Scandinavian and Anglican theologians is an apt tribute to the Archbishop's memory: for without his work it is improbable that such a Conference would have been held at all, and still more that it should have been handling such living issues in so living a way.

Our readers may remember Dr. Prideaux's verse translations of the *Odes of Solomon*, which appeared in *THEOLOGY* two or three years ago, and have since been published in book form. We print below his new version of St. Thomas's well-known Eucharistic hymn.

#### *Adoro te Devote*

HEART full, O hidden God, I Thee adore,  
Who 'neath the outward sign dost lie concealed;  
My heart for thought of Thee can think no more,  
But to Thyself itself would wholly yield.

I cannot see Thee, taste nor touch Thee here,  
Yet I believe the truth that I have heard;  
God's Very Son hath spoken; all is clear:  
Truth is not truer than the Truth's own word.

Upon the Cross Thy Godhead Thou didst veil,  
So here in turn as man Thyself dost hide;  
In both believing I my sins bewail,  
And cry as then the penitent robber cried.



Thy wounds like Thomas now I cannot see,  
 Yet as my Lord and God I Thee adore.  
 Increase Thy grace that I may trust in Thee,  
 May hope in Thee, and love Thee, more and more.

O living Bread, who givest life to man,  
 (Yet dost recall Thy Death, O living Lord),  
 Give me Thy life throughout my life's brief span,  
 And Thy sweet savour still to me accord.

The pelican her own heart's blood doth shed,  
 Cleanse Thou my unclean heart from all its stain;  
 What though the very world in sin lay dead,  
 One drop of Thine could make it whole again.

Jesu, to Thee I look, but through a veil,  
 I thirst for Thee to see Thee as Thou art  
 With unveiled face; grant that I may prevail,  
 And in that glorious Vision bear my part.

### NOTE

#### AN ANGLO-SCANDINAVIAN THEOLOGICAL CONFERENCE

A THEOLOGICAL Conference was held in Sweden this summer, consisting of fifteen members in all, representing the Church of England and the Churches of Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. The general subject was Platonism and Christianity. To attempt anything like a comprehensive summary of a week's discussions in a few pages would be unprofitable even if it were practicable; this article will therefore give first the essential facts as briefly as possible, and then attempt to outline what appears to the writer to be the main contribution made from the Scandinavian side, and the main lesson of the Conference for us Anglicans.

The Conference lasted from July 1 to 8, and was held at Sparreholm, a beautiful country house amidst a fairyland of woods and lakes, enjoying the gracious and generous hospitality of Kammarherre Emil Dickson. The members of the Conference were, on the Scandinavian side, four Swedish professors, Dr. Aulén, Dr. Nygren, and Dr. Brilioth, from Lund, and Dr. Runestam from Uppsala; from Denmark, Prof. Nørregaard and Dr. Brodersen; from Norway, Professor Ording; from Finland, Professor Gulin; and on the English side, the Master of Selwyn, Cambridge, the organizer of the Conference on our side, the Bishop of Middleton, Canon Quick, Canon Narborough, Dr. A. C. Bouquet, Fr. Hebert, S.S.M., and the Rev. J. S. Boys Smith. The late Archbishop Söderblom, who had taken very great interest in the preparations for the Conference, was able to be present for one whole day, and also invited some of the visitors to stay with him at Uppsala after the Conference was over. Actually, however, it was immediately after his return from the Conference that he was seized by the sudden illness which ended his life; and the Bishop of Middleton stayed to represent the Archbishop of Canterbury at the funeral.

The subject of Platonism and Christianity led directly to a discussion of fundamentals. Memoranda on assigned subjects had been prepared



beforehand by each member, and circulated; by this means the ground of the discussions was in large measure prepared beforehand. Much time was also saved by the fact that our Scandinavian hosts were competent enough and good enough to conduct the discussions in English, so that there was no need of interpreters. It needs to be added also, from the English point of view, that it was a great gain to us to be able to see our Scandinavian friends against the background of their own country, and their own Church, and the Swedish liturgy. The spiritual centre of the Conference was the celebration of the Eucharist according to the Swedish rite on the Sunday morning in the village church.

The discussions on the first three days were occupied with the consideration of Platonism and Christianity in history; this led up to the discussion of the Platonic and Christian ideas of God, of man, and of salvation, on the last two days.

Broadly speaking, it would be true to say that a full Nicene Christology, which was set forth on the first day of the Conference, held the field throughout, and that it was confronted in the course of the discussions with a whole series of problems and difficulties, which are involved in the vindication of the centrality of Christ as the unique Son of God and the Redeemer of the world. To these we must return; but it will be worth while to devote most of our space to the exposition of the neo-Lutheran theology, which is at present the dominant theology in the Swedish Church, by two of its foremost representatives, Dr. Aulén and Dr. Nygren. It is indeed a theology that deserves study; for it is at one and the same time deeply evangelical, thanks to its Lutheran basis, and fundamentally catholic in outlook, and thoroughly modern, accepting without reserve the methods and results of criticism. An equally important point is that it is not an attempt to force Christianity into the trammels of a system; for these theologians are deeply conscious of the danger of smoothing out in a rational systematization the deep-lying oppositions, the combinations of seemingly incompatible contraries, which are essential to all genuinely Christian theology.

This theology is, then, no mere revival of the "Lutheran Orthodoxy," which flourished in the seventeenth century as a Protestant scholasticism, on the basis of the work of Melancthon. We were reminded at the Conference that the renewed study of Luther which has taken place in Sweden and in Germany during the past twenty years has revolutionized the picture that is drawn of Luther himself, bringing back the figure of Luther in its strength and freshness, in contrast with the rather heavy conventionalism of his successors. One is tempted to say that it has now been discovered that Luther was not a Lutheran.

Dr. Aulén explained to us more than once that the modern Swedish theology is very sharply opposed to the Ritschlianism which was the dominant influence in Protestantism during the nineteenth century; that, in fact, the theological tradition which began with the "Enlightenment" two hundred years ago, and lasted till Harnack, is now to be definitely regarded as belonging to the past. That theology always tended to a humanistic conception of God, blurring the distinction between God and man, and regarding the highest human as shading off into the divine; it interpreted Christ as the Ideal Man, the embodiment of the religious and moral ideal of humanity; it tended to explain sin as imperfection, and salvation as the realization of the true self.

Consequently the Christology of the Early Church was regarded as a



transformation of the original and authentic Christianity by a hellenizing process. Dr. Aulén, on the other hand, claimed the Nicene Christology as "the self-defence of Christianity *against* the hellenizing process," against the tendency of the time which sought to remould the Christian faith as an idealistic metaphysic. Harnack's great *History of Dogma* had been written under the influence of wrong presuppositions, and the work needed to be done over again.

He explained on another occasion that this Swedish theology is very far from allying itself with the so-called Dialectical theology of Barth and Brunner, which also represents a revolt against Ritschlianism. It is significant that Sweden, unlike Denmark, has been little influenced by Barth; the reason is that the neo-Lutheran criticism of Ritschlianism was in the field first. Dr. Aulén criticized the Dialectical theology as being far too much a mere negation of the Ritschlian positions; where that theology had said *yes*, it says *no*. In opposition to the evolutionary view of history as an ordered and regular progress, the Dialectical theology sets forth an eschatological view, a denial of progress, an affirmation that the world is subject to God's judgment. In opposition to the view of salvation as a *Lebenserhöhung*, a realization of moral values, it denies the reality of present salvation, and looks for salvation in the future; the "new man" of the New Testament and of Luther it can sometimes call a mere phantom. In opposition to the humanized idea of God, it emphasizes the distance of God from man, and proclaims God as the Judge.

In opposition to both these views, Dr. Aulén set forth the idea of history as a drama of conflict, in which God is actively engaged. In this divine warfare, the Incarnation of Christ forms the central act, and His Passion and Resurrection the decisive victory. Therefore genuine Christianity is full of the note of triumph, and loves to dwell on the thought of *Christus Victor*. Salvation is not primarily the realization of the moral values in man's higher nature; rather, it is the deliverance of the whole man from self-centredness, and the re-direction of human life towards God. And salvation is not a process belonging to this world only, nor only to the next; here and now it is going on, but it is incomplete; the Christian is, in Luther's phrase, *simul justus et peccator*; the dying-to-sin and the rising up of the "new man" is a daily reality.

Such a view of Christianity requires the full Nicene Christology; and here Dr. Aulén quoted a striking passage from Luther's *Commentary on Galatians* (on Gal. iii. 13): "When therefore thou lookest upon this person, thou seest sin, death, God's wrath, hell, the devil, and all evil, overcome and dead. In so far therefore as Christ by His grace rules in the hearts of the faithful, there is no more found sin, death, and the curse; but where Christ is not known, they still remain. Thus they that believe not lack this benefit and this victory. For our victory, as John says, is our faith. This is the primary article of Christian teaching, which in time past sophists hid in darkness, and which fanatics now obscure. And here thou seest how necessary it is to confess the article about Christ's Deity. When Arius denied this, he must also deny *articulum redemptionis*. For, by Himself to overcome the world's sin, death, the curse, and God's wrath, this is not the work of any created being, but of almighty God."

Dr. Nygren expressed much the same ideas from a different angle. He is well known in Sweden as the champion of the antithesis of Eros and Agape. Eros is used in the Platonic sense, not of carnal desire, but of the striving of man after the ideal of beauty, truth, and good; it is the



effort of man to attain to the Divine, "to escape from the fetters of the sensual, and ascend to the higher world of its origin." Eros stood, therefore, in the ancient world as the expression of man's own effort to attain salvation for himself. But Agape is the precise opposite; it is not man's movement to God, but God's movement to man. Agape is the free, spontaneous, self-giving love of God; God loves men, simply because "God is Agape." And while Eros is the movement of desire towards that which is desirable, the Agape of God is manifested in Jesus as going out to sinners, simply because God is Agape, not because of "the intrinsic value of the human soul"; for this last is a Platonic, not an evangelical idea. For Christianity, souls are of value simply because God loves them, because Christ died for them; for the Divine Agape is creative, creating value in its objects. And when Christ bids His disciples "love their enemies," this love is expressly distinguished from the natural love which we have for those who do good to us; it is indeed none other than the Divine Agape itself, taking possession of human souls.

"Three great fortresses," Dr. Nygren wrote in his memorandum, "were erected by the ancient Church in defence against the Platonic conception of salvation by way of Eros." The first was the affirmation that God is the creator of heaven and earth; we do not need to be redeemed from the created world, which, as part of God's creation, is good. Evil and sin do not consist in this, that our soul has been imprisoned in the body, for this is God's own ordinance: it is, that we have in disobedience departed from Him. The second was the doctrine of the Incarnation: salvation does not consist in an escape from the body into pure Spirituality, but in the coming of God (the Logos), who has taken upon Him our flesh. Third, there was the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, which was maintained as a direct denial of the Platonic idea of the immortality of the soul, as being that part of our nature which cannot die. Resurrection and immortality are two quite different conceptions; the Church affirmed the resurrection to everlasting life not as the natural property of the soul, but as God's gift; because, in Justin Martyr's words, "God wills that it should live."

Dr. Nygren went on to say that Dionysius the Areopagite almost entirely accepted the Platonic rather than the Christian conception, and that subsequently the idea of Eros, the idea of the effort of the human soul to attain salvation for itself, deeply coloured the thought of the Middle Ages; it reappears in the idea of merit, which pervades popular Catholicism as well as scholastic theology; in the attempt of scholastic theology to ascend on the rational way, *per analogiam entis*, from the contemplation of man to God; and in the idea of the ascent of man to God which the mystics took from pseudo-Dionysius. On all these three points, said Dr. Nygren, Luther revived the Christian conception of Agape with primitive power. Luther rejects this *hinaufklettern in die Majestät Gottes*, this climbing up to the majesty of God, whether it be by the gaining of merit, or by rational demonstrations of God's existence, or by mysticism. "God has not wished us to make a ladder up to Him; *ipse descendit et paravit scalam*."

So far Dr. Nygren. Especially in the later discussions of the Conference, the strong assertion of the orthodox Christology which was made by others, as well as by these two Swedish scholars, had to be confronted with problems and difficulties. There were the problems which centre round the dependence of the affirmations of faith on the records of history, and



those which belong to the occurrence of the Incarnation at a particular time and in a particular world of ideas; here we discussed the difficulty of the eschatological outlook of the Gospels. Then there is the problem of correlating the centrality and uniqueness of the one revelation and the one redemption with the whole realization of good in the world and in mankind; the undeniable goodness of non-Christians; the great positive contribution of Humanism; the achievements of science, the progress of civilization. Then there is the problem that Christ is commonly so preached as to appear as the Saviour of the religiously-minded; how do we envisage His message for the practically-minded? And again, it was pointed out that it is easier to work out a theology of the centrality of Christ than to find and maintain the actuality of that theology in the experience of prayer. Here are problems indeed. We were left, on the one hand, with the faith that Christ is the answer—*Christus consummator*—and on the other, with the sense of difficulties greater than we are able to meet. Someone said that the maintenance of this double attitude, an affirmation and a *credo*, and a wrestling with difficulties, was typical of the Christian life of faith.

In thinking over the lesson that one would wish to draw from this Conference, one is led to emphasize the very great importance of *theology*, in the sense of the scientific study of Christian doctrine. By this I do not mean what is commonly called "definite teaching," or the issuing of statements of belief by individual theologians or by groups or parties; I mean rather the impartial and critical study of the actual governing ideas of Christianity, as they have appeared in history. Such scientific study of Christian doctrine should make it possible to see the different tendencies of thought which have appeared in the past, in their true relation to one another; and it should make it possible for us to criticize ourselves, in the sense of fixing the historical antecedents and the present tendency of the movements to which we ourselves belong. And here it is my conviction that the Swedish theologians are able to render us very real help.

By this I do not mean to express my own personal approval, for instance, of the *opinions* of Dr. Aulén and Dr. Nygren. It so happens that I approve of them warmly; but I am not now thinking of opinions; I am thinking of theological method. Here, Dr. Nygren's distinction of Eros and Agape provides an excellent instance; for it is put forth not in order to decry the one and exalt the other, but as an analysis of actual forms which religious thought has assumed.

Theological questions arouse our deepest feelings, for they deal with matters which are of the most vital importance. Nevertheless, there is a scientific truth about the development of ideas in the past, and on many of the most important points it is possible to arrive at an analysis which cannot be far wrong. The point, then, is this, that the scientific study of theology can lead to the laying of a groundwork which can deliver us from uncritical assumptions on the very points which divide us most; thus, a scientific study of theology makes it at once impossible to accept the teaching of the Latin Church as if it had been always the same, or as if it were exactly in accord with the New Testament; and for another school of thought in the Church, it should lead at once to a readiness to criticize the assumptions of nineteenth-century theological liberalism.

The Church of England is trying hard in these days to understand herself and her own inheritance; and this effort of self-understanding is



vital to her unity and to her consciousness of her own mission. There are at the same time disruptive tendencies, especially party-allegiances; but, on the theological side, that which holds us together is the sense of a common message. It is this that most needs to be strengthened; and nothing can so help to strengthen it, on the theological side, as the scientific study of Christian doctrine. In our theological colleges we need less instruction and more education. And here there is real help to be found from Swedish churchmen.

There is doubtless much that they, on their side, can profitably learn from us; but, whatever it be, it is not for us to tell them what we think it is. It is for them to find it out, and apply it in their own way. But on our side, if we find that there is something there that we need, it is for us to do our best to bring it home.

A. G. HEBERT, S.S.M.



## REVIEWS

AEGIDIUM ROMANI THEOREMATA DE ESSE ET ESSENTIA. Texte précédé d'une introduction historique et critique par Edgar Hocedez, S.J., Professeur de Théologie, Louvain. 1930.

Giles of Rome was a pupil of St. Thomas. According to Mandonnet he studied under the Angelic Doctor from 1269 to 1272. Already in 1287 he was proclaimed Doctor of his own order of the Augustinian Hermits, which required all its members to follow henceforth all his opinions present and future. In the history of Scholastic philosophy he is famous chiefly as the defender of one of its most fundamental doctrines, the real distinction between essence and existence. With Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines he was one of the recognized masters of that philosophy during the last quarter of the thirteenth century, the years which lie between the death of St. Thomas and the rise of Duns Scotus.

Giles's treatment of the "real distinction" is known principally through his *Quæstiones Disputatæ de Esse et Essentia*. The *Theoremata*, a slighter work consisting of twenty-two propositions each followed by an expository commentary, has for some reason or other remained almost unknown, though it exists in nine manuscripts (one at Merton College, Oxford) and was printed three times before 1522. Père Hocedez, whose studies of Richard of Middleton and Henry of Ghent place him in the front rank of mediæval scholars, has now prepared a careful text with all the necessary critical apparatus and prefaced it with an historical and critical introduction of admirable fulness and clearness. He discusses among other matters the date of the *Theoremata*, the element of novelty in Giles's doctrine of the "real distinction," the other conceptions of that distinction prevalent during the last quarter of the thirteenth century, the relations of Giles's doctrine to that of St. Thomas, and Giles's influence upon his contemporaries and immediate successors. Two further sections of the introduction contain a lucid exposition of the really distinctive elements in Giles's doctrine, and a careful estimate of the measure of Neoplatonic influence upon it. Finally, in a most interesting and important section, Père Hocedez discusses what he calls the "enigma of Thomism," by which he means the strange fact that for seven centuries controversy has raged round the nature of St. Thomas's



conception of the "real distinction," while as to that of Giles there has never been a shadow of doubt. The fact of course is strange just because of the importance attached to the conception in all later developments of the Thomist ontology.

Hocedez' solution of the enigma is simple, and seems to be conclusive. As a matter of history the controversy over the "real distinction" dates only from the first Quodlibet of Henry of Ghent (Christmas, 1276, nearly three years after the death of St. Thomas), which was an express and vigorous refutation of that distinction as expounded by Giles. From that moment onwards the controversy becomes universal and acute, and remains so for at least half a century. Throughout that period Giles is evidently regarded, both by supporters and opponents of the "real distinction," as its chief protagonist. Besides, there were many theologians among members of St. Thomas's own order who were opponents of the "real distinction," who contended that it had not been taught by St. Thomas, and who certainly could not have adopted either of these attitudes if it had been included in the body of doctrine officially recognized by the Dominicans as that of their great Doctor. Such hesitation is intelligible when we remember that in the later history of Scholasticism, though it had then become matter of general agreement that the doctrine had actually been taught by St. Thomas and that it was all-important for the Thomist system, there yet remained much indecision among theologians as to what exactly it had meant for him. The real reason for all this fluctuation and variety of opinion is that St. Thomas had never himself treated the subject *ex professo* and in detail. It was only incidentally in his treatment of other subjects, as, for instance, angelology, for which it seemed important, that he drew the distinction. In his own oral teaching, therefore, the doctrine need not have attracted any particular attention, and, as we have seen, the statements of it in his writings were variously interpreted even by his own most faithful followers for at least half a century after his death. Giles, on the contrary, convinced of its cardinal importance for theology, stated and defended the doctrine in such uncompromising form as to make it a crux of theological controversy for some generations.

To any later student of the Thomist ontology, indeed, it may seem strange that the distinction should have given rise to discussion at all. For that ontology the distinction between the *quod est* and the *quo est*, what a thing is and the act by which it is, is fundamental. What a thing is, its definition, that which in its broadest sense we call its essence, is no doubt a creature, a discovery, of the reason. As such it has independent existence, is a reality, a *res*. But it is only as actualized in the



world of concrete existences that this *res* becomes an *ens*, an actual concrete entity. Yet the *res* and the *ens* do not exist independently of each other. The *res* has concrete existence only in the *ens*, the *ens* has rational or intelligible existence only through and by virtue of the *res*. Thus *res* and *ens*, essence and existence, are distinct, but do not exist separately. The essence is not a Platonic idea having a concrete eternal existence of its own. With this Thomist conception of the relation of *res* and *ens* all the Angelic Doctor's analysis of the nature of created being accords—form and matter, potentiality and actuality, genus and species. They are all methods of explaining the intelligibility of things, ways by which the intellect seizes things in a world of becoming. And each group of these dyads presents itself as a distinction of the two members even though they exist concretely only in their compositeness. For even potentiality must have some actualization before the mind can recognize it as potentiality to further actuality. But there is one outstanding exception to this state of affairs, at least for St. Thomas. He held that the angels were purely spiritual substances, intelligences separated from all dependence upon matter for their being—in other words, that they were pure forms. There might seem, therefore, to be an entire absence in their case of that compositeness which was the mark of every created nature and being. It was indeed the difficulty of conceiving of this apparent simplicity of the angelic nature that led so many of the contemporary Schoolmen to adhere so obstinately to the doctrine of hylemorphism—the doctrine, viz., that every created being, even the angels, must consist of matter and form. The difficulty, however, was solved by St. Thomas by the assertion of such a real distinction between essence and existence as constituted a real compositeness in the angelic nature. Only the Divine Nature, in which essence and existence were necessarily one, was or could be *simplex*.

Now St. Thomas never very clearly defines this distinction between essence and existence. He seems usually to conceive of it on the analogy of *potentia* and *actus*. Existence is the actualization of a substance. Or, again, he uses the analogy of substance and accident. The compositeness of the angelic nature is the compositeness of a substance or essence and of the existence which attaches itself (as it were accidentally) to that substance, *sicut ex substantia et eo quod adhæret substantiæ*. These analogies Giles found insufficient. Still more insufficient in his eyes was the Thomist formula *forma dat esse*. This indeed was not only insufficient, but also misleading. Since the essence of a thing was admittedly constituted by its form, the formula *forma dat esse* might seem to identify essence with



existence. That was no doubt very far from St. Thomas's intention. But Giles was determined to guard against all ambiguity by forcing the note in his statement of the distinction. The reality of the distinction could not be saved without conceiving it as a distinction between two separate things. Essence and existence are distinguished *ut res et res*. They are *duæ res*. As Hocedez very justly points out, these formulæ are in strict Scholastic terminology equivalent to saying that essence and existence are two essences. But Giles of course means by it to affirm that they are two separate realities—a still more dangerous assertion, perhaps, since it may seem to be an approach to the Platonic conception of the ideas as separate entities. Giles indeed guards himself jealously against such an interpretation in adhering firmly to the Thomist doctrine that an essence cannot exist without an existence, nor an existence apart from its essence. Yet it was just his insistence upon this formula, his habit of imaginatively *reifying*, as Hocedez describes it, his concepts that provoked so much opposition, both contemporary and more recent, to the real distinction as he expounded it.

But, with whatever exaggerations of statement, Giles vindicated the importance for theology, and especially for the doctrine of creation, of a real compositeness in all created existence, a compositeness beyond that of matter and form implied in all generation, beyond that of *potentia* and *actus* implied in all becoming, a compositeness of the intelligible and the actual, of essence and existence, which lay not merely within the world of becoming, but beyond as it were in the very act of creation. And every careful reader of these *Theoremata* will be inclined to agree with Père Hocedez when he claims for their author the character of a bold, profound and original thinker, rightly acclaimed by both contemporaries and successors as one of the great masters of the Scholastic philosophy.

A. L. LILLEY.

### BISHOP GORE'S GIFFORD LECTURES\*

Those of us who were born ten years or so before the close of the last century remember our youth as a time of insistent questioning of all accepted ideas, customs and conventions. It may be that such questioning is characteristic of youth at all times. Nevertheless it had, I believe, a peculiar flavour for us, for what we had to question were the ideas, customs and

\* *The Philosophy of the Good Life*: Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews, 1929-30. By Charles Gore, D.D. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930.



conventions of the great Victorian age of English civilization. It is generally agreed that, however much that edifice may have been cracking during our adolescence, the forces that shattered it were released by the war. Our outlook can, perhaps, best be grasped by considering how that shattering appeared in our eyes. We did not deplore it as an outbreak of immorality submerging "the good life"; we welcomed it as a stripping away of shams and a revelation of what we genuinely were. "Now," we thought, "where there is morality, it will be genuine morality; and if there seems to be a lot of immorality about, that is only so because it is now honestly apparent and no longer hypocritically concealed, or abstained from because of the pressure of mere conventions."

We took it for granted that this was a good thing, because it was accepted as axiomatic by our generation that "conventions" were bad things, stifling to thought, and obstacles in the way of developing real goodness. And we assumed (as young men tend to do) that all honest and sincere thinkers accepted with us this fundamental presupposition. It was therefore with a distinct sense of shock one evening (it must have been about the year 1917) that I heard the chance remark of an elder whose honesty and sincerity in thinking I could not question, from whom, indeed, more than any other one man, I had learned to respect those virtues and to try to pursue them. "It will take more than our lifetime," he said, "to get back even the conventions of Victorian morality." That sentence, with the word "even" inserted as its keystone, opened up a new and fruitful line of reflection. It was apparently possible to regard conventions not as hypocritical substitutes for genuine morality, but as useful helps towards its attainment. I was reminded of this remark some ten years later, when talking to a parish priest in an industrial centre in the North of England. He had come back from a C.O.P.E.C. Conference, full of wrath against some speaker who had been denouncing "respectability." "I might have talked like that," he said, "when I was young and knew nothing of life. But knowing, as I do now, something of the temptations my boys and girls have to struggle with in a town like this, I thank God for *anything* that helps them to go straight, and if the conventions of 'respectability' help (as they do), I wouldn't move a finger to destroy them."

So spoke the more thoughtful and experienced among our elders. Meanwhile, our juniors were continuing the criticism we had raised, and carrying it further. To quote one further remark, I remember one of my own contemporaries saying towards the close of the war: "We of our generation have claimed absolute freedom of thought about everything; the



next generation are carrying our work to its logical conclusion by claiming absolute freedom to experiment in action. Who are we to reproach them? They will justly answer that they are only doing what we talked about, but lacked the nerve to practise."

In this way it has come about that we of the later 'eighties have found ourselves torn in two ways. We can no longer dismiss our elders as shallow conventionalists, for we share with them that concern for "genuine morality" which underlies their estimate of conventions. On the other hand, we feel a kinship of the spirit with our juniors who share our questioning mind, and we cannot withhold our admiration from the pluck with which they have ventured their lives to experiment with our wordy hypotheses. And we are puzzled by the extent to which that experimentation has led to a questioning not merely of the conventions of our elders, but even of that "genuine morality" which we had always respected. We may learn from our elders to regard "restoring conventions" as but a step to achieving something more; but now we must press the question: Why should we want to rebuild the something more? *Why*, for example, should we rate self-control above "having a good time"? This is the question which is being insistently asked of us by our juniors, and which it is by no means easy to answer. A few years ago the father of an American family was accidentally killed, leaving his widow and children in sudden and unexpected poverty. The eldest son had to leave school, abandon his anticipated university career, and settle down to most uncongenial work in a bank. Some two years later I ventured to remark to his elder sister my admiration for the way in which he was "sticking it." She replied that she failed to see any virtue in "sticking it"; it seemed to her rather a foolish thing to do. In this she was speaking not for herself alone, but for a whole multitude of her contemporaries. Foremost among our elders in America who are wrestling with this situation are such writers as Mr. Paul Elmer More and Professor Irving Babbitt; but their attempts at reconstruction are impatiently ignored as based on unfounded assumptions. They have not answered the fundamental "Why?" This year's Pulitzer Prize for the best novel descriptive of American life has been deservedly awarded to Margaret Ayer Barnes' *Years of Grace*, which poses the same question and leaves it unanswered. And, lest we should delude ourselves into thinking that the problem is exclusively transatlantic, Princess Bibesco has given us in *Portrait of Caroline* an analogous picture in the setting of English life.

Those of our generation who have to confess ourselves puzzled may perhaps draw some comfort from the reflection that the greatest of philosophers in history have been thinkers:



who have struggled like drowning men to find some firm ground under their feet in a sea of doubt and perplexity. We may feel a kinship with Socrates, who found the Sophists occupying a position in Athens analogous to that of Professor John Dewey in the university life of New York. We may feel a kinship with Descartes, who saw his accepted universe exploded by the Copernican revolution, and with Kant when he was awoken from his dogmatic slumber by the scepticism of Hume. We realize that we, like them, must expect to have to go through the stage of knowing that we do not know, of doubting everything that can be doubted, of criticizing all accepted presuppositions, before we can find the firm ground under our feet on which to build.

It is, I think, the absence of this sense of bewilderment which we younger men and women feel most striking about the contribution of Bishop Gore to the philosophical thought of our day. It may be that he has passed through it when he was our age; but the outstanding mark of his Gifford Lectures is a robust and triumphant faith which enables him to be not so much philosopher as *arbiter philosophiarum*. And the centre of his faith is his enthusiasm for our Lord. No one can read his book without feeling how central is the seventh lecture on "Jesus the Christ." In form it is the same dispassionately historical survey as is given to Zarathustra, the Buddha, and the teachers of Asia, Greece and Israel. But there is an undercurrent of personal devotion which cannot be denied its influence on his style. Is this due merely to some personal idiosyncrasy or prejudice of the lecturer; or can it be that God has indeed become incarnate, entered into the history of this world, and so laid hold on us that no man can give his life to His service without receiving that assurance of faith for which the philosopher seeks, that direct revelation of the truth which justifiably provides a criterion of philosophies?

In this twentieth century we are coming to think of the physical universe as a stream of energy moving down time from past to future and knotting itself up, so to speak, into various kinds of things and creatures. The fundamental question at issue is whether this process is a blind surge of unintelligent and unintelligible energy, or the expression of the intelligent and intelligible will of One who is and means good. On our answer to this question depends our conception of "the good life." The former view, which is the uncriticized assumption of much current life and practice, is to all intents and purposes that of the *Rubáiyát*:

"Into this universe, and why not knowing,  
Nor whence, like water willy-nilly flowing:  
And out of it, as wind along the waste,  
I know not whither, willy-nilly blowing."



It demands the solution of all ethical problems within the horizon of human life on earth. Within that narrow vista must lie the answer to the question "What's the use?" And centuries ago the author of the Book of Job revealed its insolubility within those limits.

On what grounds can we justifiably base a faith in the second view, and thus find a meaning in the existence of this universe and our life within it? The Christian contention is that by treating certain historical events as of supreme significance for the interpretation of the whole time-process, we can make sense of things in a way which no other hypothesis can equal. From this point of view the problem of "the good life" which we have found to be so insistent today, the problem of *Years of Grace* and *Portrait of Caroline*, is and must remain insoluble so long as we persist in trying to solve it on the basis of what we may call a pre-Job level of insight. Only if we accept the life and teaching of Jesus Christ as the revelation in history of God's will for man can we find an adequate criterion of the comparative worth of human acts and motives.

In his last five lectures Bishop Gore considers the kind of metaphysic implied in this Christian acceptance of Christ, defending the thesis that this metaphysic makes more sense of the universe than any other. One feels, as I have said, that the progress of the argument is that of a believer's exposition of his faith rather than of a philosopher's quest. But its value is no less on that account. Philosophy, to be of value, must always be interpretation of the actual, and in the pursuit of logically possible implications has often to be called back to remember that possibilities which are not rooted in actuality are nothing at all. When a man has lived to a ripe age, has found a way of living which has approved itself to him as being on the right lines and has borne fruit in widely recognized contributions of value to the good life of his day and generation, there is no more helpful gift he can offer to the philosophers of his time than to bear witness to the faith in which that life has actually been lived. And though Bishop Gore's temperament be prophetic rather than philosophical, his knowledge of philosophy is such that he treads with sure feet when he enters the philosophical arena, and demands that the disputants therein pay attention to what he has to say of the actual manifestation of "the good life" in history. Let them face *that*, interpret it, and fit it into their systems if they can. For history is both the material and the criterion of philosophy, and it is the wisdom of deep experience of life which recalls us to face anew the fact of Christ, and testifies that those who make Him the material of their thinking are led by Him to find in Him the criterion of "the good life."

LEONARD HODGSON.



## NOTICES

JOHN WILLIAM HOYLAND OF KINGSMEAD. By H. G. Wood. S.P.C.K.  
7s. 6d.

This is the record of a gracious personality who was called upon to play a leading part in two main activities: (1) The development of Evangelical Quakerism; (2) the unique experiment in interdenominational co-operation in education now in progress at Selly Oak, a suburb of Birmingham. The story is pleasantly and easily told by Hoyland's successor at Kingsmead, and the interest is sustained throughout. The Society of Friends is perhaps little known outside its own rather small and intimate circle. This book affords the reader many an interesting sidelight into the life of this circle through the medium of a figure which, if outstanding, is also sufficiently typical. After a not unsuccessful business career, Hoyland was chosen as the obvious man to be the first Warden of Kingsmead, the second Quaker institution—the first being Woodbrooke—to be started at Selly Oak, the object of which was to provide a centre of training for missionaries. The nucleus of a group was thus established, and much of the story has to do with the remarkable expansion of that group. It also brought Hoyland into touch with a very wide circle, including S.P.G., C.M.S., and the Wesleyan body. Many shrewd sayings of his are recorded, and show him to have been a wide-minded man of many sympathies. Thus early in life he writes from Antwerp in approval of the "Continental Sunday." One meets with "Sunday toys" in his own household. He does not want Kingsmead to be "a Quaker stew-pot." He sees the great importance of women as missionaries. "I feel," he says, "increasingly that women are needed more than men. Women rule the destinies of both men and women in both lands (India and China), and who is to reach them but women?" Again, concerning union, one of the passions of his life and the mainspring of his work, "the only way to realize union is to live and work together. It will never come by resolutions of Governing Bodies." Selly Oak has been responsible for our own *Essays Catholic and Missionary*, which surely owes much to Hoyland's spirit. At his funeral, on February 19, 1926, it is recorded that "his friends could not but recall his fine commanding presence that inspired respect and confidence, his unfailing courtesy and modesty, his genial humour and large-hearted sympathy that endeared him to all who knew him, his strong simple faith that made him a great rock to perplexed and tempted spirits." Yes! a gracious personality, and one the reader will be glad to have met.

R. LL. LANGFORD JAMES.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. By Jacques Maritain. Translated by J. F. Scanlan.  
Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d.

This attractive presentation of some aspects of the personality and influence of Aquinas follows close upon, and should be read after, the same writer's *Introduction to Philosophy* and *Art and Scholasticism*, both devoted to exposition and illustrative of the philosophical concepts of the same "master of the schools." The author informs us that he has in mind not a mediæval but a perennial and "actual" Thomism capable of reaffirming itself in the contemporary context. One of his chief aims



is to present the Thomist philosophy as the necessary means of integrating concepts which apart from this unification remain partial, or sterile, or confused. The claim that Aquinas stated the philosophy capable of affording the principles both of continuity and of universality is a great claim, but is one which can be sustained. Philosophy by its own movement and aware of its task in this generation grows up into St. Thomas. All the major problems of present-day metaphysical enquiry, inclusive of those which are emphasized by the contact of East and West; the "actual" philosophy of Giovanni Gentile; the antithesis between the absolute and the universal flux; the relation of process to reality—all imply decisions within the scope of, or gain intelligible solution by means of, concepts inherent in the system of Aquinas. This wisdom may be made to yield "in appropriate forms of presentation and by thorough sifting" the intellectual values whereof the age stands in need. Nothing below the level of the mind can cure the prevailing denials of the intelligence.

This testimony and description is worthy of being accepted; but whether this catholic and universal task carries with it, or even can coexist with, the particular form of papal jurisdiction with which M. Maritain weights his book is at least a question, and there may be many readers who would have felt glad if this fascinating writer had, in place of a rather laboured effort in propaganda, given more detailed and reasoned exposition and defence of his well-founded estimate of "the angelic doctor."

F. W. BUTLER.

ST. TERESA IN HER WRITINGS. By the Abbé R. Hoornaert. Translated by Rev. J. Leonard. Sheed and Ward. 15s.

This translation of a valuable work on St. Teresa is to be welcomed, for it presents a rare balance of critical judgment and sympathy. Most studies of St. Teresa are either so eulogistic as to obscure the vitality of the saint or else are so lacking in understanding of the inner life as to be caricatures. "Teresa of Avila has been honoured as a saint, praised as a doctor, but not sufficiently admired as a writer," says the author at the beginning of his summing up. But he gives us more than a merely literary study—it is a vivid and balanced examination of St. Teresa's spirit.

The book is divided into three parts, of which the first is the least successful. It may even ruin the reputation of the whole work. It is entitled "Sixteenth-Century Spain," and describes St. Teresa's historical and social background. But no one with even a merely average knowledge of history can accept the sweeping generalizations about the state of Europe outside Spain. The sixteenth century was fierce and blood-thirsty, but it had other characteristics too, and these the author ignores. There were high lights as well as dark shadows, and the lights were not confined to Spanish cloisters. Nor was England the blackest corner of the inferno. If the statements about other countries are suspicious, those about England are positively childish. The author has not withstood the temptation that seems to beset Roman writers who deal with Spanish Mysticism of blackening the background to make the subject stand out. It is a great pity that this inaccurate and on the whole rather dull section should open the book; it may prevent readers from exploring the other two sections, which are admirable.



Part II., "St. Teresa's Literary Powers," is a detailed study of her intellectual and spiritual make-up, and will be prized both by lovers of the saint and by those to whom this is the first introduction.

Part III., "The Works Themselves," is purely literary, an analysis of the works and of their technique.

The translation is surprisingly good, and reads like an original. The statement on p. 22 that Charles IX. of France died at eighty (instead of twenty-four) must be a slip. One might have expected more help with the frequent Spanish words. They are not always translated or explained, and might bother the reader who, knowing only English, must read the work in translation instead of in the much cheaper original.

V. I. RUFFER.

OFFICE PSALMS FROM ROLLE'S PSALTER. Edited by Geraldine Hodgson. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 6s.

This is primarily a work for scholars, but the ordinary reader may find much pleasure and profit in it. It consists of Rolle's version of the Psalms of the Lesser Hours—Prime, Terce, Sext, None, Compline—and his comments on each verse, and notes are appended giving St. Augustine's comments (from the *Enarrationes*) where they differ or elucidate. The commentary will be interesting chiefly to those who are accustomed to or patient with the mediæval manner of exegesis—often fantastic, but equally often interesting, rarely accurate. But the translation of the Psalms themselves is singularly pleasing, and one would value the book for that alone. Both in the Psalms and in the commentary there are many phrases of that intimate and beautiful tenderness—"très pratique et très discret," as Dom Noetinger says of it—which is one of the glories of mediæval English Mysticism. The price of this small volume seems unnecessarily high.

V. I. RUFFER.

MAN AND THE IMAGE OF GOD. By H. M. Foston, D.Lit. Macmillan. 7s. 6d.

A brief note must suffice for this interesting book, which a reviewer with philosophical qualifications returned unreviewed after a year. It is an attempt to found an argument for the doctrine of the Trinity on the threefold nature of man. The Son corresponds to the intellect, the Spirit to willing, the Father to feeling. The last identification may seem strange. It is based on the fact that we never experience feeling directly, only the sensations caused by it; so the Father is not known by us directly. The author maintains that the appearance of a threefold nature of the Godhead in early Christian thought corresponding to what has been discovered lately about human nature is difficult to account for unless the doctrine of the Trinity is true. The book is written in a most delightful style, and the critic is disarmed by the modesty with which the thesis is presented. He will probably continue to doubt whether progress is possible along these lines; with a little ingenuity the parts might be interchanged. And is not the tripartite division of man primarily a convenient device of the psychologists?

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.



CHRISTINA ROSSETTI. A Study. By Fredegond Shove. Cambridge University Press. 5s.

The author of this short appreciation of Christina Rossetti offers it "as a stimulus to the quickly coming, freshly reading generation of poetry lovers of today." She is in love with her task and her subject, and therefore cannot fail to have some success in the really impossible work of telling others what Christina means to herself. She depends chiefly on what William Michael Rossetti told us of his sister's life, and of course upon the poems themselves, as her book was written before Miss Sandars' recent biography appeared. She treats in four chapters Christina's life, poems, prose, and general relation to the later Victorian age. The picture of the Rossetti home is attractive, and the account of the great sorrows of her life delicately touched. Mrs. Shove's appreciation of the peculiar beauties of the poetry is sincere and deep-sighted; personally I should have liked more of this, and could well have borne the loss of the last two chapters. It is impossible to regard Christina as a great prose writer, and Mrs. Shove is not very successful in "relating" her to people like Matthew Arnold and Browning. No! Christina was an accident of the nineteenth century; she really lived in the seventeenth. Vaughan, Herbert, and Drummond were her contemporaries, not Arnold and Browning.

It is curious how all the Victorian women poets have faded, while Christina only shines the brighter as time passes. Surely because she did not belong much to time at all. "Lo, in the new Jerusalem my feet shall tread on light." She was there already, not in the stuffy Bloomsbury houses she lived in while on earth.

We English are peculiar people. It is said our Church breeds no saints, and we stolidly acquiesce; then a saint comes, obviously a saint by every sign of suffering, nearness to God, fulness of vision, beauty of spirit, perfection of expression, and we begin to criticize her limitations. Who would not admit that Christina had her limitations? Perhaps they are the self-imposed limitations of one who so enters into life, and so only. *Goblin Market* suggested infinite possibilities of breadth and power and future scope; but Christina Rossetti only left behind her a wealth of sacred lyrics, "short swallow-flights of song." It is impossible for them to mean much to those outside, but to those within the Kingdom they are its authentic language. And they who would learn the language cannot do better than learn at the knees of Christina, Anglican singer and saint.

W. J. FERRAR.

CHALCEDON. By J. S. MacArthur, B.D. S.P.C.K. 6s.

The Chalcedonian definition has of late come in for a good deal of unintelligent criticism, and not always very intelligent defence. One great merit of this volume is that it sets the whole Christological controversy in its true historical setting. When this has been done it can be shown that the definition was at the same time a valuable assertion of truths that needed to be safeguarded, and also that the theological ideas and presuppositions accepted by all parties are far from satisfactory to our modern minds. Mr. MacArthur's treatment is clear and sensible. His judgments are sound, and he draws attention to several neglected points. His book will be useful to all students of theology who are interested in the period. If at times it is not altogether easy reading, that is due to



the complexity of the subject. We notice that on p. 89 he appears not to have observed that modern scholars tend to hold that Tertullian's use of *persona* is based primarily, not on its legal use, but on its grammatical use. The point is of importance for Christological study.

E. J. BICKNELL.

GOTTESREICH, WELT UND KIRCHE BEI CALVIN. By Lic. K. Fröhlich. E. Reinhardt, München, 1930. Sewn, 4.80 M.; bound, 6.50 M.

This little book attempts to set forth the relation of the Kingdom of God to the world and the Church in Calvin's thought. There are three great stages in the history of the Kingdom of God: Election, Salvation, and the Last Judgment. The process of election and judgment was going on in Calvin's own life-time and is still at the present day. All God's elect are united in Christ, and are members of one body. Calvin pleads passionately for the unity of the Church, which is Catholic or universal. The people of God are engaged in the service of Christ (*militia Christi*) and fight against Satan.

This conflict between good and evil determines the character of Calvin's ethics. As Professor Lobstein points out, the ethical subject is not the moral man in general, but the believing and regenerate Christian. The basis of Christian conduct is obedience to the will of God. From the legal aspect, God is the law-giver, who must be obeyed. On the other hand, the end of moral actions is always God's honour and glory.

Calvin was convinced of the reality and progress of the Kingdom of God in his own day. The divine State was nearly set up in Geneva from the year 1553, owing to Calvin's talent for organization.

Calvin's conception of the Church as the company of the elect gives rise to the distinction between the visible and the invisible Church. The characteristic features of the Calvinistic conception of the empirical Church are (1) organization, (2) the pure service of the "word," (3) doctrine, (4) universalism or unity. (1) The organization is set out in the *Ordonnances Ecclésiastiques* of 1541. There are four kinds of offices, pastors, teachers, elders, and deacons. (2) The sacraments are the seals of God's holy word and His promises. (3) The doctrine is the word of Christ, as revealed in Holy Scripture. (4) The unity of the Church is closely connected with the unifying bond of the word.

Lastly, the Kingdom of God must be distinguished from worldly power. Calvin wished the civil power to serve the Kingdom of Christ. The ideal of citizenship is free obedience. All good Christians must obey the king, and opposition to the civil power is the crime of rebellion, which is an outrageous revolt against God. The sovereignty of the worldly authority is a mirror of the divine sovereignty. In this way worldly power may be the instrument for the establishment and advance of the Kingdom of God. Calvin follows in the footsteps of St. Paul and St. Augustine in laying the foundations of a truly Christian State.

L. PATTERSON.

IN THE HEART OF SOUTH LONDON. By Cyril Forster Garbett (Bishop of Southwark). Longmans. 3s. 6d.

London, either North or South, is not homogeneous. Its districts, boroughs, parishes present infinite variety and bewildering differences to the student of human nature.



A book such as this by a Bishop is at once a challenge and a claim. We know South London; it is on our doorstep. We know its people. We know their brave struggle against poverty, their gallant spirit amid the appalling conditions of overcrowding and desperate home problems. We know the uncertainty of employment, which issues so often in anything from mental and spiritual anæmia to windy protest against society as constituted. We know their patience, their whimsical quips, their hopes as they stand dauntless still even in face of despair.

You cannot help South London until you get into the heart of South London; until you sniff with satisfaction its heavily scented air, and understand its patois; until you make its pain and sadness, its patience and sense of fun, your own; and *then* bring to bear the power of the living Christ, the purifying of the Holy Spirit.

In addition we have been so counselled, advised, inspected, and legislated for that we approached this book with some misgiving. On closing the volume our first feeling was surprise.

"In the heart of South London?" *The Bishop has got there!*

Beside this, other points are of minor importance. You cannot give a complete picture; South London is too many-sided for that. What is told here is well told. In particular, his story of the work of the Church and of Settlements is timely; such work is not self-advertised, and therefore easily passed over. Even if he gives no new and striking suggestions on ways and means of grappling with problems that cry for solution, his appreciation of the efforts, both of public bodies and private persons, to deal with the matter of housing is generous and valuable. Here, though, while he does justice, perhaps more than justice, to the L.C.C., he has hardly given expression to the strenuous efforts of some of the poorest boroughs, which are becoming considerable.

The housing problem bulks large for South London; it lies close to the heart of many problems, not only of public health, but of morals and religion too.

ANDREW AMOS.

### BOOK NOTES

*The Epistles to the Corinthians* (Clarendon Bible). By E. Evans, B.D. Clarendon Press. 4s. 6d. The characteristics of this series are well known by now. The Revised Version is printed, short comments on difficult passages are given, with summaries of sections, and detached essays make a good many notes unnecessary. The present volume is well up to the expected standard. The names of other scholars are scarcely mentioned, but their views are generally given full weight. Sometimes Mr. Evans ventures acute suggestions of his own. In view of the extraordinary difficulty surrounding the excepting clause in Matt. v. 32, xix. 9 and the various interpretations favoured by good scholars, he is not justified in saying that the word *πορνεῖα* "must" refer to promiscuous misconduct on the part of the wife. The illustrations are chosen with admirable skill, and reflect the greatest possible credit on whoever is responsible for them.

*Matthew Parker's Witness against Continuity.* By H. E. G. Rope. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 2s. 6d. A statement, conceived in a spirit of bitterness, of the data which lead us to think that the Elizabethan



Church was, in its own estimation, a new creation. Such controversy is largely beside the mark. Anglicans do not attempt to justify many of the utterances here pilloried. But they do hold that nothing happened to invalidate the continuity, which Father Rope acknowledges to be externally unchallengeable. He assumes the very point at issue, that jurisdiction could not be validly given except by the Pope. Nor does he mention what was self-evident to the Elizabethans and explains much that they did, the conviction that a national Church had an inherent right to reshape itself on the model of the primitive Church.

*Prayer Book Counsel and Penances.* By R. H. Le Mesurier. Faith Press. 2s. Intended as a *vade mecum* for the priest in the confessional. Penances from the Prayer Book are collected under different headings, in three main sections—moral, ascetic, and mystical. "All the confessor has to do is to turn up the heading he wants, and run his eye down the list of key-phrases until he sees that which most particularly fits the case." Thus if it is "ignorance (culpable)" he will find the second Collect of Morning Prayer and the fifth post-Communion Collect, and a reference to "knowledge of God" and "Truth." But does meditation on the post-Communion Collect ("who knowest . . . our ignorance in asking") really help to cure culpable ignorance? None of us knows what is best for him, so this kind of ignorance cannot be culpable.

*The Stone Rejected.* By W. A. Wordsworth. Langham (Farnham). 6d. Isaiah was all written by the prophet whose name it bears. The second half of the book refers to the exile of those who were carried away in Hezekiah's day. Cyrus is an insertion in the text made by a later Jewish scribe. Christ is in the book throughout. Mr. Wordsworth's pamphlet will not be taken seriously by scholars, but it suggests two observations. First, from a different standpoint he comes to the same conclusion as Dr. Torrey, that Cyrus makes nonsense of Deutero-Isaiah; indeed, the prevailing critical hypothesis cannot be regarded as a proved fact. Secondly, he suggests a line of thought which is being now worked out in Germany, an approach to the Bible other than the critical one, but equally valid. But whereas the Germans are laboriously trying to establish methodological principles, Mr. Wordsworth confuses two methods, each valid in its own sphere.

*Evolution and Faith.* With other essays. By Bishop Hedley. Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d. It is no overstatement when we say that this new publishing firm has established new standards in Roman Catholic publishing. Leaving books intended for the school, the pulpit, and the sacristy to the older publishers, its managers have produced already a fine series of books intended to spread a Catholic culture in England. They have done good service in introducing German Catholic writers to England. There is little in their books to make them unsuitable for Anglicans. To publish a volume of essays written at various periods between 1871 and 1879 is indeed a bold venture. How much written in 1871 about evolution is worth the paper it is printed on! This reply to Darwin certainly is, and more. There are also splendid essays on such subjects as "Everlasting Punishment," "Prayer and Contemplation," "Religious Controversy," etc.

W. K. L. C.